Designing Auctions for Concessions : Guessing the Right Value to Bid and the Winner's Curse
Once a government has decided to award a concession by auction, it needs to decide what kind of auction to use. For concessions the standard is a first-price sealed bid auction in which bidders submit sealed envelopes containing their offer and the...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1998/11/441575/designing-auctions-concession-guessing-right-value-bid-sinners-curse http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11525 |
| Summary: | Once a government has decided to award a
concession by auction, it needs to decide what kind of
auction to use. For concessions the standard is a
first-price sealed bid auction in which bidders submit
sealed envelopes containing their offer and the highest
offer determines the price. The bidding may occur in one or
two stages. In two-stage bidding the technical parameters of
the bids are made comparable in the first stage, and only
the main offer on the core bid parameter is submitted in the
second. The main offer may relate to a price, a level of
subsidy, a payment for net worth, or any other appropriate
parameter; the discussion in this Note focuses on price. |
|---|