Management Contracts in Water and Sanitation : Gaza's Experience
In 1995, as the interim agreements between the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel were signed, water and sanitation services in the Gaza Strip were in crisis. In mid-1996 Lyonnaise des Eaux/Khatib and Alami (LEKA) was awarded a four-year...
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| Language: | English |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1999/04/441506/management-contracts-water-sanitation-gazas-experience http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11488 |
| Summary: | In 1995, as the interim agreements
between the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel
were signed, water and sanitation services in the Gaza Strip
were in crisis. In mid-1996 Lyonnaise des Eaux/Khatib and
Alami (LEKA) was awarded a four-year water services
management contract to help local government service
providers and the Palestinian Water Authority improve water
service. Since the contract became active, water quality has
improved, water losses have fallen, and consumption and
revenues have increased. Despite the improved performance,
the management contract has illustrated some limitations.
Overall, the Gaza experience suggests that management
contracts are most likely to work under four conditions: 1)
The primary objective is to rapidly enhance the technical
capacity and efficiency of services. 2) Government faces
obstacles to committing to a long-term arrangement for
private participation in infrastructure or to inducing the
private sector to undertake capital investment or take on
commercial or political risk. 3) Tariffs are too low to
support a long-term arrangement for private participation in
infrastructure. 4) Government faces difficulties in securing
agreements to allow the long-term involvement of the private
sector or the regulatory framework is incompatible with a
long-term arrangement for private participation in infrastructure. |
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