Strengthening Legislatures : Implications from Industrial Countries
With more developing and post-communist states embracing democracy, improving the performance of their congresses, parliaments, and other legislative assemblies has become a must. These bodies make laws, hold the executive branch accountable, and r...
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| Language: | English |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/03/2011708/strengthening-legislatures-implications-industrial-countries http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11354 |
| Summary: | With more developing and post-communist
states embracing democracy, improving the performance of
their congresses, parliaments, and other legislative
assemblies has become a must. These bodies make laws, hold
the executive branch accountable, and represent citizen
interests. Good governance demands that each of these tasks
be done well. Thus aid agencies have begun supporting
programs that train legislators and their staff, provide
computers and buildings, and otherwise strengthen the
legislative branch of government. But while some programs
have succeeded, the overall results have been disappointing.
One reason is that many programs have ignored a key
principle of public sector reform: success requires changing
the incentives facing public officials (World Bank 2000).
More effective legislative aid programs will require donors
to understand what motivates legislators and how those
incentives can be altered. This note surveys the main
factors shaping incentives for legislators in industrial
countries and suggests how these factors can inform
legislative reform in developing and transition economies. |
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