Lessons from Armenia's Institutional and Governance Review
Institutional and Governance Reviews (IGRs) are a new tool in the Bank's package of analytical and advisory activities (see PREMnote 75). Because they are politically sensitive, the development of these reviews involves careful tradeoffs. Thou...
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| Language: | English |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/12/2518704/lessons-armenias-institutional-governance-review http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11332 |
| Summary: | Institutional and Governance Reviews
(IGRs) are a new tool in the Bank's package of
analytical and advisory activities (see PREMnote 75).
Because they are politically sensitive, the development of
these reviews involves careful tradeoffs. Though each
requires thorough analysis of a country's institutional
shortcomings, the final product must be acceptable to
country authorities and other development partners. To be
credible and acceptable, an IGR must reflect extensive
participation by a variety of national stakeholders. In
Armenia the Bank's IGR team engaged the government
(executive, legislature, judiciary), civil society
(nongovernmental organizations, political parties, trade
unions, academics), and other development partners from the
outset. This approach resulted in widespread acceptance of
the report's analysis and recommendations within both
Armenia and the Bank. Armenia's IGR was a pioneering
effort by the Bank's Europe and Central Asia Region to
systematically evaluate a country's public institutions
and develop a program of reforms supported by follow-up
operations. The IGR had two main objectives. First, it was
to diagnose institutional dysfunction at the national level
using quantitative benchmarks of performance. Second, it was
to assess political realities and constraints to reform, to
foster the sustainability of Bank operations. Armenia was
chosen for several reasons. There was a dearth of analytical
work on public sector institutional reforms prior to 1998.
Moreover, country authorities evinced keen interest in an
IGR-and were matched by strong support from the Bank's
country unit and team.. |
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