Description: Controlling Market Power : Balancing Antitrust and Sector Regulation in Telecoms

Cover Image

QR Code

Controlling Market Power : Balancing Antitrust and Sector Regulation in Telecoms

Among the countries fully liberalizing their telecommunicationssector, some have chosen to rely mainly on sector-specific rules,often applied by sector-specific institutions, while others havedepended on economywide antitrust rules and...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Kerf, Michel, Neto, Isabel, Geradim, Damien
Language:	English
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:	ANTITRUST ANTITRUST AUTHORITIES ANTITRUST AUTHORITY ANTITRUST LAW ANTITRUST LEGISLATION ANTITRUST REGULATION AUTHORIZATION COMPETITION LAW ECONOMIC REGULATION INNOVATIONS JUDGES LEGISLATURE LICENSES MARKET CONDITIONS MARKET POWER MARKET SEGMENTS MONOPOLIES PHONES PRESIDENCY PRICE REGULATION PRIVATE SECTOR PROVISIONS PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC RESOURCES PUBLIC SUBSIDIES REGULATOR REGULATORS REGULATORY AGENCY REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS REGULATORY INTERVENTION REGULATORY REGIMES RETAIL RETAIL PRICES SPREAD TELECOMMUNICATIONS TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES TELECOMS UNBUNDLING UNIVERSAL SERVICE UNIVERSAL SERVICE OBJECTIVES
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/06/6040141/controlling-market-power-balancing-antitrust-sector-regulation-telecoms http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11216

Description
Summary:	Among the countries fully liberalizing their telecommunicationssector, some have chosen to rely mainly on sector-specific rules,often applied by sector-specific institutions, while others havedepended on economywide antitrust rules and institutions to controlmarket power. This Note describes the choices made by five notablereformers: Australia, Chile, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and theUnited States. Drawing on their experiences, it then assesses whetherantitrust or sector-specific processes have dealt more quickly andeffectively with key regulatory issues.