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Labor Mobility for the Poor : Is it Really Possible?

Despite mounting evidence that supports the pro-poor benefits of migration, it has not been easy to unlock doors into development country labor markets. This is largely because both labor sending and receiving countries are unsure that such program...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Luthria, Manjula
Language:English
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:
ADVERTISING
BLACK MARKET
BROKER
CAPACITY BUILDING
CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS
COMPETITIVENESS
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
CREDIBILITY
DEBT
DEBT SERVICE
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONS
DEVELOPMENT POLICY
DISPLACEMENT
DUE DILIGENCE
ECONOMIC BENEFITS
ECONOMIC THEORY
EMPLOYMENT
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
EXPORT GROWTH
FACTOR PRICE
FINANCIAL MARKETS
FINANCIAL SUPPORT
FIXED COSTS
FOREIGN LABOR
FOREIGN WORKERS
GAME THEORY
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM
GLOBAL ECONOMY
GLOBAL TRADE
GLOBALIZATION
GROWTH POLICY
GROWTH THEORY
HOST COUNTRIES
HOST COUNTRY
HOST GOVERNMENT
HOST GOVERNMENTS
INCOME
INTANGIBLES
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
LABOR MARKET
LABOR MARKET CONDITIONS
LABOR MARKET NEEDS
LABOR MARKETS
LABOR MOBILITY
LABOR MOVEMENTS
LABOR PROGRAMS
LABOR SHORTAGES
LABOR SUPPLY
LABOUR
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
LOCAL MARKETS
MARKET ACCESS
MARKET FAILURES
MARKET RESTRICTIONS
MARKETING
MOTIVATION
MULTILATERAL TRADE
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
PERFECT COMPETITION
PRECEDING DISCUSSION
PRIVATE SECTOR
PRIVATE TRAINING
PRODUCTIVITY
PRODUCTIVITY GAINS
PUBLIC GOOD
REMITTANCE
REMITTANCES
RETURN
RETURNS
RETURNS TO SCALE
REVOLVING FUNDS
SAFETY
SEASONAL WORKERS
SKILLED WORKERS
SOCIAL COSTS
SOCIAL NETWORKS
SPREAD
SUBSTITUTION
TACIT COLLUSION
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
TEMPORARY WORKER
TRADE LIBERALIZATION
TRADE POLICY
TRADING
TRAINING COSTS
TRAINING PROGRAMS
UNEMPLOYMENT
UNSKILLED JOBS
UNSKILLED LABOR
UNSKILLED WORKERS
VOLATILITY
WAGES
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2011/01/13474158/labor-mobility-poor-really-possible
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/10112
Description
Summary:Despite mounting evidence that supports the pro-poor benefits of migration, it has not been easy to unlock doors into development country labor markets. This is largely because both labor sending and receiving countries are unsure that such programs can be designed or executed in a manner that considers their respective (and often competing) interests. This note offers guidance on how to design and implement scheme that is win-win for both host and source countries.

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