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Emerging Threats of Synthetic Biology and Biotechnology : Addressing Security and Resilience Issues.

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Trump, Benjamin D.
Other Authors: Florin, Marie-Valentine., Perkins, Edward., Linkov, Igor.
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands, 2021.
Edition:1st ed.
Series:NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security Series
Subjects:
Electronic books.
Online Access:Click to View
Table of Contents:
  • Intro
  • Disclaimer
  • Acknowledgments
  • Contents
  • About the Editors
  • Chapter 1: Biosecurity for Synthetic Biology and Emerging Biotechnologies: Critical Challenges for Governance
  • 1.1 An Introduction to the Dual-Use Nature of Emerging Biotechnology
  • 1.2 History
  • 1.3 Effective Governance and Policy for Biosecurity
  • 1.4 Conclusion
  • References
  • Chapter 2: Emerging Biosecurity Threats and Responses: A Review of Published and Gray Literature
  • 2.1 Introduction
  • 2.2 Methods
  • 2.3 Results and Discussion
  • 2.3.1 US and EU Governmental Frameworks
  • 2.3.1.1 US Framework
  • 2.3.1.2 EU Framework
  • 2.3.2 Threats Identified in the Literature
  • 2.3.3 Responses Identified in the Literature
  • 2.4 Conclusion
  • References
  • Chapter 3: Opportunities, Challenges, and Future Considerations for Top-Down Governance for Biosecurity and Synthetic Biology
  • 3.1 Introduction
  • 3.2 Understanding the Scope and Limitations of Top-Down Governance for Biosecurity and Synthetic Biology
  • 3.2.1 International Instruments for Biosecurity
  • 3.2.1.1 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)
  • 3.2.1.2 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
  • 3.2.1.3 Australia Group, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 and Others
  • 3.2.2 National Implementation
  • 3.2.2.1 Hard Law vs. Soft Law
  • 3.2.2.2 Biosafety vs. Biosecurity, GMOs vs. Synthetic Biology
  • 3.2.2.3 National Implementation: An Inevitable Patchwork
  • 3.3 Key Novelties and Tensions Introduced by Synthetic Biology
  • 3.3.1 Convergence
  • 3.3.2 Democratization
  • 3.3.3 Intangibility
  • 3.4 Conclusions and Recommendations
  • References
  • Chapter 4: Biological Standards and Biosecurity: The Unexplored Link
  • 4.1 Standards in Biology
  • 4.2 Implications of Standards in Biosecurity in Terms of Risks
  • 4.3 Universality
  • 4.4 Chassis and Trojan Horses
  • 4.5 Breaking Down the Species Barrier.
  • 4.6 Standards as Social Constructs
  • 4.7 Final Remarks and Open Questions
  • References
  • Chapter 5: Responsible Governance of Biosecurity in Armenia
  • 5.1 Introduction
  • 5.2 Capacity Building in Dual Use Export Control in TI Partner Countries
  • 5.3 Legal Framework Governing Dual Use Life Sciences and Biosecurity
  • 5.3.1 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare - Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925
  • 5.3.2 The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction
  • 5.3.3 United Nation Security Council Resolution No. 1540 (UNSCR 1540)
  • 5.3.4 National Laws and Law Enforcement
  • 5.4 Ethics of Dual Use Life Sciences
  • 5.5 Case Study Life Sciences and Biosecurity in Armenia
  • 5.6 Dual Use Life Sciences in Armenia
  • 5.7 Discussing Ethical Dilemmas
  • 5.8 Conclusions and Recommendations
  • References
  • Chapter 6: Addressing Emerging Synthetic Biology Threats: The Role of Education and Outreach in Fostering Effective Bottom-Up Grassroots Governance
  • 6.1 Introduction
  • 6.2 Structure of the Synthetic Biology Community
  • 6.3 Perceptions of Risks Within the Synthetic Biology Community
  • 6.4 Enhancing Stakeholder Interaction in the Field of Biosafety and Biosecurity
  • 6.5 Conclusion
  • Chapter 7: Cyberbiosecurity and Public Health in the Age of COVID-19
  • 7.1 Introduction
  • 7.2 Privacy of Contact Tracing Data
  • 7.3 Protecting Public Health and Disease Surveillance Data
  • 7.4 Integrity and Validation of Self-Administered Testing
  • 7.5 Integrity of Public Bioinformatic Databases
  • 7.6 Defending Against Cyberattacks on Laboratory Devices
  • 7.7 Protection of Intellectual Property
  • 7.8 Discussion.
  • Chapter 8: Synthetic Biology Brings New Challenges to Managing Biosecurity and Biosafety
  • 8.1 Resilience as a Complimentary Philosophical Framework to Managing Potential Biohazards
  • 8.2 COVID-19 Pandemic as a Call to Action for Resilience in Biosafety and Biosecurity
  • 8.3 A Domain-Based Resilience Framework to Adapt to Biosecurity and Biosafety
  • 8.3.1 Physical Domain
  • 8.3.2 Information Domain
  • 8.3.3 Cognitive Domain
  • 8.3.4 Social Domain
  • 8.4 Discussion
  • References
  • Chapter 9: Emerging Biotechnology and Information Hazards
  • 9.1 What Is an Information Hazard?
  • 9.2 When Do Information Hazards Matter?
  • 9.3 How Might Information Hazards Be Governed?
  • 9.4 Information Hazards: Where Do We Go from Here?
  • References
  • Chapter 10: Technical Aspects of Biosecurity: Screening Guidance, Attribution, and Traceability
  • 10.1 Introduction
  • 10.2 Current Technology
  • 10.2.1 DNA Sequence Screening
  • 10.2.1.1 State-of-the-Art
  • 10.2.1.2 Next-Generation Tool Development
  • 10.2.2 Attribution and Traceability
  • 10.2.3 Gaps in Existing Biosecurity Technology Framework
  • 10.3 Imminent Opportunities for Technology Development
  • 10.3.1 Biological Threat Prevention
  • 10.3.1.1 Design
  • Specification
  • Design Tools
  • Selecting Chassis
  • Tools to Enhance Tracking of Users and Research
  • 10.3.1.2 Build
  • Who Should Be Screening Synthesis Production in the Future?
  • A Stratified White List Approach for DNA Synthesis Production
  • Functional Equivalence of Sequences
  • DNA Assembly and Smaller DNA Synthesis Providers
  • Attribution and Tracing
  • 10.3.1.3 Test
  • Physical Containment
  • Biology-Based Containment
  • Horizontal Gene Transfer
  • 10.3.1.4 Economic Drivers
  • 10.3.2 Detection of Biological Threats
  • 10.3.2.1 Diagnostics
  • 10.3.2.2 Surveillance
  • 10.3.3 Threat Response and Countermeasures.
  • 10.4 Long-Term Opportunities for Technology Development
  • 10.4.1 Implications for Adaptive Risk Management Framework
  • 10.4.2 Imagining the Far Future
  • Chapter 11: The Soil Habitat and Considerations for Synthetic Biology
  • 11.1 The Soil System
  • 11.1.1 Soil Properties
  • 11.1.2 Life in Soil
  • 11.2 Fitness of Genetically-Altered Organisms
  • 11.2.1 Fitness of Domesticated Microorganisms
  • 11.3 Considerations for Survival in Soil
  • 11.3.1 Soil Conditions Influence Growth
  • 11.3.2 Microbial Adaptations
  • 11.3.3 Fitness of Microorganisms in Soil
  • 11.4 Conclusions
  • References
  • Chapter 12: Foresight in Synthetic Biology and Biotechnology Threats
  • 12.1 Introduction
  • 12.1.1 Foresight Terminology
  • 12.1.2 Examples of Foresight for Biological Threats
  • 12.2 Foresight Methods
  • 12.2.1 General Approach
  • 12.2.2 Delphi Method
  • 12.2.2.1 Strengths
  • 12.2.2.2 Limitations
  • 12.2.3 Horizon Scanning
  • 12.2.3.1 Strengths
  • 12.2.3.2 Limitations
  • 12.2.4 Scenario Analysis
  • 12.2.4.1 Strengths
  • 12.2.4.2 Limitations
  • 12.3 Foresight Questions
  • 12.3.1 Approach to Choosing Questions
  • 12.3.2 Questions for Synthetic Biology Threats
  • 12.4 Recommendations
  • 12.4.1 Foresight Process Design
  • 12.4.2 Synthetic Biology Considerations
  • 12.5 Conclusion
  • References
  • Chapter 13: Predicting Biosecurity Threats: Deployment and Detection of Biological Weapons
  • 13.1 Methods of Deployment
  • 13.2 Targets
  • 13.2.1 Humans
  • 13.2.2 Agriculture
  • 13.2.3 Technology
  • 13.2.4 The Environment
  • 13.3 Screening Techniques
  • 13.3.1 Pre-deployment: Gene Synthesis
  • 13.3.2 Post-deployment: Pathogen Detection
  • 13.4 Conclusion
  • Literature Cited
  • Chapter 14: Promoting Effective Biosecurity Governance: Using Tripwires to Anticipate and Ameliorate Potentially Harmful Development Trends
  • 14.1 Introduction
  • 14.2 Biological Weapons in History.
  • 14.3 Promoting Responsible Research in Modern Biotechnology: Tripwires as a Framework to Understand Red-Team Capacity and Intent for Nefarious Deployment of Technology
  • 14.3.1 Regime Characteristics that Could Lead to Synthetic Biology Weapons Development and Their Tripwires
  • 14.3.1.1 Stage 1a. Bottom-Up Initiative: Independent Actors Indicate Interest in Synthetic Biology
  • 14.3.1.2 Stage 1b. Top-Down Initiative: Regime Indicates Interest in Synthetic Biology
  • 14.3.1.3 Stage 2. Achievement of Scientific, Technological, and Engineering Capacity for Synthetic Biology
  • 14.3.1.4 Stage 3a. Active Development of Synthetic Biology Weapons
  • 14.3.1.5 Stage 3b. Acquisition of Synthetic Biology Weapons from an External Source
  • 14.3.1.6 Stage 4. Deployment of Synthetic Biology Weapons
  • 14.3.2 Key Enabling Technologies and Technological Tripwires
  • 14.4 Conclusion
  • References.

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