Security of Ubiquitous Computing Systems : Selected Topics.
Main Author: | |
---|---|
Other Authors: | |
Format: | eBook |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Cham :
Springer International Publishing AG,
2021.
|
Edition: | 1st ed. |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | Click to View |
Table of Contents:
- Intro
- Preface
- From the Cryptacus Project to the Cryptacus Book
- Book Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Contents
- Contributors
- Part I Introduction
- 1 Emerging Security Challenges for Ubiquitous Devices
- 1.1 Introduction
- 1.2 Malicious Devices and Watchdog Concept
- 1.2.1 Attacks by Malicious Devices
- 1.2.2 Active Watchdog Concept
- 1.2.3 Solution Strategy
- 1.2.3.1 Commitments: Problems with Solutions Based on Hash Functions
- 1.2.3.2 Commitments Based on Symmetric Encryption
- 1.2.3.3 Encrypted Random Challenge
- 1.2.3.4 Answers to Challenges
- 1.2.3.5 Distance Bounding Protocols
- 1.3 Privacy
- 1.3.1 Symmetric Protocols and Deniability
- 1.3.2 Identity Hiding with Random Key Predistribution
- 1.3.2.1 Key Discovery with a Bloom Filter
- 1.3.2.2 Multiple Shared Keys
- 1.3.2.3 Epoch Keys
- 1.3.3 Overloading Identifiers
- 1.3.4 Pairwise Keys Evolution
- 1.3.5 Transmission with Errors
- 1.4 Conclusion and Future Directions
- Part II Lightweight Cryptographic Primitives
- 2 Catalog and Illustrative Examples of Lightweight Cryptographic Primitives
- 2.1 Introduction
- 2.2 Catalog of Lightweight Cryptographic Primitives
- 2.2.1 Block Ciphers
- 2.2.2 Stream Ciphers
- 2.2.3 Hash Functions
- 2.2.4 Message Authentication Codes
- 2.2.5 Authenticated Encryption Schemes
- 2.3 Illustrative Issues in Security Evaluation of Certain Encryption Schemes
- 2.3.1 Reconsidering TMD Tradeoff Attacks for Lightweight Stream Cipher Designs
- 2.3.2 Guess-and-Determine Based Cryptanalysis Employing Dedicated TMD-TO
- 2.3.2.1 Generic Approach
- 2.3.2.2 Summary of Cryptanalysis of Grain-v1 Employing Guess-and-Determine and Dedicated TMD-TO Approaches
- 3 Selected Design and Analysis Techniques for Contemporary Symmetric Encryption
- 3.1 Introduction
- 3.2 Keystream Generators with Keyed Update Functions.
- 3.2.1 Design Approach
- 3.2.2 On Continuously Accessing the Key
- 3.2.3 The Stream Ciphers Sprout and Plantlet
- 3.3 A Generic Attack Against Certain Keystream Generators with Keyed Update Functions
- 3.4 Randomized Encryption Employing Homophonic Coding
- 3.4.1 Background
- 3.4.2 Encryption and Decryption
- 3.4.3 Security Evaluation
- 3.5 Conclusion and Future Directions
- 4 An Account of the ISO/IEC Standardization of the Simon and Speck Block Cipher Families
- 4.1 Introduction
- 4.2 Simon and Speck
- 4.2.1 Simon
- 4.2.2 Speck
- 4.3 Simon and Speck's ``Design Rationale''
- 4.3.1 Lack of New Information
- 4.3.2 Choice of the Number of Rounds
- 4.3.3 Misquoting Existing Work
- 4.4 The ISO/IEC JTC 1 Standardization Process
- 4.5 The Standardization Process of Simon and Speck in ISO/IEC 29192-2
- Part III Authentication Protocols
- 5 ePassport and eID Technologies
- 5.1 Application Scenarios
- 5.1.1 Remote vs. Local Use
- 5.1.2 Actors and Scenarios
- 5.1.3 Goals of Protocol Execution
- 5.2 Threats and Security Requirements
- 5.2.1 Assets
- 5.2.2 Threats
- 5.3 Cryptographic Protocols for eIDs
- 5.3.1 Preventing eID Forgeries
- 5.3.2 Enforcing Owner's Consent
- 5.3.3 EID Authentication and Preventing Cloning
- 5.3.4 Authenticating the Terminal and Its Rights
- 5.3.5 Proof of Interaction
- 5.3.6 Passive Tracing
- 5.3.7 Eavesdropping
- Summary
- 5.4 PKI
- 5.5 Challenges for eID Systems
- 5.6 Future Directions
- 6 Ultra-lightweight Authentication
- 6.1 Introduction
- 6.1.1 A Fully Connected World of Small Devices
- 6.1.2 Authentication: Protocol Classification and Physical Constraints
- 6.1.3 Design Challenges
- 6.1.4 Organization of the Chapter
- 6.2 Ultra-lightweight Authentication Protocols
- 6.3 Weaknesses and Pitfalls
- 6.3.1 Poor Diffusion and Linearity
- 6.3.2 Poor Message Composition.
- 6.3.3 Biased Output
- 6.3.4 Rotations
- 6.3.5 Vulnerability to Knowledge Accumulation
- 6.3.6 Dubious Proofs of Security: Randomness Tests and Automated Provers
- 6.4 Towards a Sound Approach
- 6.4.1 State of the Literature
- 6.4.2 Promising Avenues
- 6.4.3 The Reductionist Approach
- 6.5 Conclusions
- 7 From Relay Attacks to Distance-Bounding Protocols
- 7.1 An Introduction to Relay Attacks and Distance Bounding
- 7.1.1 Relay Attacks
- 7.1.2 Distance Bounding
- 7.1.3 Other Relay-Countermeasures
- 7.2 Relay Attacks in Practice
- 7.2.1 Basic Relay Strategies
- 7.2.1.1 Purpose-Built Relays
- 7.2.1.2 Off-the-Shelf Relays
- 7.2.2 Advanced Relay Strategies
- 7.2.2.1 Early Send and Late Commit
- 7.2.2.2 Speeding Up the Prover's Response
- 7.3 Canonical Distance-Bounding Protocols
- 7.3.1 General Structure
- 7.3.2 The Hancke-Kuhn Protocol
- 7.3.3 The Brands-Chaum Protocol
- 7.4 Distance-Bounding Threat Model and Its Formal Treatments
- 7.4.1 Main Threat-Model
- 7.4.1.1 Mafia Fraud (MF) [178]
- 7.4.1.2 Distance Fraud (DF) [113]
- 7.4.1.3 Distance Hijacking (DH) [160]
- 7.4.1.4 Terrorist Fraud (TF) [178]
- 7.4.2 Provable Security and Formal Verification
- 7.4.2.1 Symbolic Verification
- 7.4.2.2 Provable Security
- 7.4.2.3 Provably-(in)Secure Protocols
- 7.5 Distance-Bounding Protocols in Practice
- 7.5.1 NXP's Mifare Technology
- 7.5.2 3DB Technology
- 7.5.3 Relay-Resistance in EMV
- 7.6 Current Challenges in Distance Bounding
- 7.6.1 Theory vs. Practice
- 7.6.2 Application-Aware DB
- 7.6.3 Specialist Implementations and Slow Adoption
- Part IV Hardware Implementation and Systems
- 8 It Started with Templates: The Future of Profiling in Side-Channel Analysis
- 8.1 Introduction
- 8.2 Profiled Side-Channel Attacks
- 8.2.1 Definition of Profiling Attacks
- 8.2.2 Data Preprocessing
- 8.2.3 Feature Engineering.
- 8.3 Template Attacks
- 8.3.1 Context of Template Attack
- 8.3.2 Standard Template Attack
- 8.3.3 Pooled Template Attack
- 8.3.4 Stochastic Attack
- 8.4 Machine Learning-Based Attacks
- 8.4.1 Conducting Sound Machine Learning Analysis
- 8.5 Performance Metrics
- 8.6 Countermeasures Against SCA
- 8.7 Conclusions
- 9 Side Channel Assessment Platforms and Tools for Ubiquitous Systems
- 9.1 Introduction
- 9.2 Side Channel Attacks, Leakage Assessment Methods and Problems
- 9.2.1 Side Channel Attack Categories
- 9.2.2 Leakage Assessment Using t-Test
- 9.2.3 Practical Considerations in SCA Trace Collection
- 9.3 Side Channel Attack Trace Collection Platforms
- 9.3.1 Proposing a Fast Trace Collection Approach Beyond the Traditional Model
- 9.4 A Use Case of a Flexible and Fast Platform for DUT SCA Evaluation
- 9.5 Conclusions
- 10 Challenges in Certifying Small-Scale (IoT) Hardware Random Number Generators
- 10.1 Introduction
- 10.2 Certification, Standards, and Testing
- 10.3 Challenges in Data Collection
- 10.4 Appropriate Selection of Tests
- 10.4.1 Randomness Testing Under Data Collection Constraints: Analyzing the DESFire EV1
- 10.4.2 Identifying Issues with Quantum Random Number Generators
- 10.5 Conclusion
- 11 Finding Software Bugs in Embedded Devices
- 11.1 The Challenges of Embedded Devices and Software
- 11.1.1 Lack of Transparency
- 11.1.2 Lack of Control
- 11.1.3 Lack of Resistance to Attacks
- 11.1.4 Organization of This Chapter
- 11.1.5 Classification of Embedded Systems
- 11.2 Obtaining Firmware and Its Components
- 11.2.1 Collecting Firmware Packages
- 11.2.2 Extracting Firmware from Devices
- 11.2.3 Unpacking Firmware
- 11.2.4 Firmware Unpacking Frameworks
- 11.2.5 Modifying and Repacking Firmware
- 11.3 Static Firmware Analysis
- 11.3.1 Simple Static Analysis on Firmware Packages.
- 11.3.1.1 Configuration Analysis
- 11.3.1.2 Software Version Analysis
- 11.3.2 Static Code Analysis of Firmware Packages
- 11.3.2.1 Code Analysis of Embedded Firmware
- 11.3.2.2 Discovering Backdoors with Static Analysis
- 11.3.2.3 Example Static Analysis to Discover Code Parsers
- 11.4 Dynamic Firmware Analysis
- 11.4.1 Device-Interactive Dynamic Analysis Without Emulation
- 11.4.2 Device-Interactive Dynamic Analysis with Emulation
- 11.4.3 Device-Less Dynamic Analysis and Emulation
- 11.5 Conclusion
- Part V Privacy and Forensics
- 12 Privacy-Oriented Analysis of Ubiquitous Computing Systems: A 5-D Approach
- 12.1 Introduction
- 12.1.1 Goal and Plan of the Chapter
- 12.2 Background and Previous Work on Privacy in UCS
- 12.3 5-D Classification and Analysis of Privacy Risks
- 12.3.1 Identity Privacy
- 12.3.2 Query Privacy
- 12.3.3 Location Privacy
- 12.3.4 Footprint Privacy
- 12.3.5 Intelligence Privacy
- 12.4 Future Trends and Challenges
- 12.4.1 Privacy by Design
- 12.4.2 Individual-Centred Privacy
- 12.4.3 Growing Importance of Legislation
- 12.5 Conclusions
- 13 IoT Forensics
- 13.1 Introduction
- 13.2 Forensics
- 13.2.1 Digital Device Forensics
- 13.2.2 Other Digital Forensics
- 13.2.3 The Need for IoT Forensics
- 13.3 Challenges in IoT Forensics
- 13.3.1 General Issues
- 13.3.2 Evidence Identification, Collection and Preservation
- 13.3.3 Evidence Analysis and Correlation
- 13.3.4 Presentation
- 13.4 Opportunities of IoT Forensics
- 13.5 An Example of an IoT Forensics Case
- 13.6 Research Overview
- 13.6.1 New Models and Frameworks
- 13.6.2 Preparation Step with Repository
- 13.6.3 Real-World Systems
- 13.7 Conclusion and Future Research Directions
- References.