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Nuel Belnap on Indeterminism and Free Action.

Featuring critical assessments of Belnap's work, and a paper by the celebrated philosopher himself on case-intensional first order logic, this selection of original research on a much-debated topic charts his impact on the discussion and builds on his ideas.

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Müller, Thomas.
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Cham : Springer International Publishing AG, 2014.
Edition:1st ed.
Series:Outstanding Contributions to Logic Series
Subjects:
Electronic books.
Online Access:Click to View
Table of Contents:
  • Intro
  • Contents
  • 1 Introduction: The Many Branches of Belnap's Logic
  • 1 About this Book
  • 2 State of the Art: BT, BST, stit, and CIFOL
  • 2.1 Branching Time (BT)
  • 2.2 Branching Space-Times (BST)
  • 2.3 Seeing to it That (stit)
  • 2.4 Case-Intensional First Order Logic (CIFOL)
  • References
  • 2 Decisions in Branching Time
  • 1 Introduction: Decision Theory and Deontic Logic
  • 2 Seeing to it That (stit)
  • 2.1 Semantics for cstit with One Agent
  • 2.2 Multiple Agents: Independence and Joint Agency
  • 3 Causal Independence
  • 4 Horty's Dominance Ought
  • 5 Decisions Under Ignorance: The Maximin Ought
  • 6 Decision Under Risk: Probabilistic Utilitarian stit Frames
  • 7 Game Theory and Mixed Strategies
  • 8 Conclusion
  • References
  • 3 Internalizing Case-Relative Truth in CIFOL+
  • 1 Introduction
  • 1.1 Grammar and Semantics
  • 1.2 Finding ``True in a Case'' in CIFOL+
  • 1.3 Paths not Taken
  • 1.4 Extending CIFOL
  • 1.5 Picturing Intensions
  • 2 Theory of Internal Ranges
  • 2.1 CIFOL+ and Elementary Ranges
  • 3 Proving Theorem 1
  • 4 The concept of case-relative truth
  • 5 Summary
  • References
  • 4 A stit Logic Analysis of Morally Lucky and Legally Lucky Action Outcomes
  • 1 Introduction
  • 2 Modeling Indeterminacy of Action
  • 2.1 Determinate Action: XSTITp
  • 2.2 Action with Non-Determinate Effect: XSTIT.Prob
  • 3 Modeling the Determination in Action
  • 3.1 Risk in Action
  • 3.2 Attempt
  • 4 Moral Obligations, Prohibitions and Luck
  • 5 Legal Obligations, Prohibitions and Luck
  • 6 Discussion
  • 7 Conclusion
  • References
  • 5 Worlds Enough, and Time: Musings on Foundations
  • 1 Core Features of Ockhamist Branching Time
  • 2 Newton Versus Einstein
  • 3 The Enigmatic Present
  • 4 What is a World?
  • 5 Chronological Unity and Belnap's World(s)
  • 6 The General Character of Models
  • 7 Comparing Belnapian Worlds.
  • 8 Belnapian Multi-Worlds
  • 9 The Making of an Agent
  • 10 Conclusion
  • Bibliography
  • 6 Open Futures in the Foundations of Propositional Logic
  • 1 Introduction
  • 2 What Rules Express
  • 3 What Intuitionistic Logic Expresses
  • 4 Open Future Semantics
  • 5 What Propositional Logic Expresses
  • 6 What Natural Deduction Rules for Disjunction Express
  • 7 No Past Branching
  • 8 Open Future Semantics and Supervaluations
  • 9 Defeating Fatalism
  • References
  • 7 On Saying What Will Be
  • 1 Branching Time and Ontic Frugality
  • 2 Some Concepts from Speech Act Theory
  • 2.1 Speech Acts Versus Acts of Speech
  • 2.2 Saying Versus Asserting
  • 2.3 Two Levels of Determination
  • 2.4 Assertion Proper and the Assertive Family
  • 3 Assertion and Scorekeeping
  • 4 Future-Directed Speech Acts
  • 5 The Assertion Problem
  • 6 The Modal Realism Objection
  • References
  • 8 The Intelligibility Question for Free Will: Agency, Choice and Branching Time
  • 1 The Intelligibility Question: An Introductory Narrative
  • 2 Action, Indeterminism, and Facing the Future
  • 3 From Action to Free Will
  • 4 Self-forming Actions (SFA's)
  • 5 Further Issues: Efforts, Introspection, Agency, Control, Rationality
  • References
  • 9 What William of Ockham and Luis de Molina Would have said to Nuel Belnap: A Discussion of Some Arguments Against ``The Thin Red Line''
  • 1 There is No Truth Concerning Future Contingents
  • 2 A Thin Red Line Theory is Insufficient as a Background for a Proper Understanding of the Structure of Tenses in Natural Language
  • 3 An Obvious Requirement Regarding Iterative Tenses Makes TRL Theories Problematic
  • 4 TRL Theories Lead to Problematic Evaluations at Counterfactual Moments of Time
  • References
  • 10 Branching for General Relativists
  • 1 Introduction
  • 2 BST with a New PCP
  • 3 How to Generalize BST1992?
  • 4 Construction.
  • 4.1 BST Generalized
  • 4.2 Generalized Differential Manifolds and Matters Topological
  • 4.3 Tangent Vectors
  • 5 Discussion
  • 5.1 Hájíček-Müller Quasi-History
  • 5.2 Borders in the Overlap
  • 6 Conclusions
  • References
  • 11 Some Examples Formulated in a `Seeing to It That' Logic: Illustrations, Observations, Problems
  • 1 Introduction
  • 2 Syntax and Semantics
  • 2.1 Preliminaries: Transition Systems
  • 2.2 Agency Modalities
  • 2.3 Acts Differently
  • 2.4 `Brings It About' Modalities
  • 3 Example: Vase (One Agent)
  • 4 Example: Vase (Two Agents)
  • 5 Example: Vase, Minor Variation
  • 6 Example: Table
  • 7 Example: Avoidance (Fixed)
  • 8 Example: Avoidance (Reaction)
  • 9 Example: Granularity
  • 10 Conclusion
  • References
  • 12 In Retrospect: Can BST Models be Reinterpreted for What Decisions, Speciation Events and Ontogeny Might Have in Common?
  • 1 Introduction
  • 2 First Step: BST Structures and Structures of FTA
  • 2.1 BST Structures
  • 2.2 BTA Structures
  • 2.3 BTA+U Structures are BST Structures
  • 2.4 What Does it all Mean?
  • 2.5 The Unity of Life
  • 2.6 What Else Can be Done with BTA?
  • 3 Retrospect
  • 3.1 The Story so Far
  • 3.2 Theory of Possible Ancestry (TPA)
  • 3.3 The Growth of Life Itself
  • 3.4 Speciation
  • 3.5 Individual Ontogeny
  • 4 Afterthought: Resuscitation and Decisions
  • 5 Summary
  • References
  • 13 A Theory of Possible Ancestry in the Style of Nuel Belnap's Branching Space-Time
  • 1 Ersatzism of Belnapian Elegance
  • 2 The Basic Theory of Possible Ancestry
  • 3 The General Form of a Theory of Possible Ancestry and Some Specific Theories
  • 4 The Question of Embeddability: States, Moments, and Histories
  • 5 Ontological Competition
  • 6 Back To Branching Space-Time: General Relativity
  • References
  • 14 Connecting Logics of Choice and Change
  • 1 Introduction: Logical Frameworks for Agency.
  • 2 Preliminaries: The STIT Framework
  • 3 Modeling Choice Situations
  • 3.1 The Modal Heart of Choice
  • 3.2 An Initial Comparison with Modal Logics of Action
  • 3.3 Merging the Two Perspectives on Action
  • 4 A Merged System: Matrix Game Logic
  • 4.1 Modal logic of matrix games
  • 4.2 STIT in Modal Matrix Logic
  • 4.3 Complexity and Correlation
  • 5 The Roles of Knowledge
  • 6 Dynamic Epistemic Logic Meets STIT
  • 7 Further Directions
  • 8 Conclusion
  • References
  • 15 Intentionality and Minimal Rationality in the Logic of Action
  • 1 Analysis of Propositional Contents of Attitudes
  • 2 My New Approach in the Logic of Propositional Attitudes
  • 2.1 Analysis of Psychological Modes and Possession Conditions of Attitudes
  • 2.2 Analysis of Satisfaction Conditions of Propositional Attitudes
  • 3 Intentionality in the Logic of Action
  • 4 Fundamental Valid Laws
  • References
  • 16 Group Strategies and Independence
  • 1 Stit Frames
  • 2 Outcomes
  • 3 Fields and Outcomes Bordering Fields
  • 4 Strategies and Their Admitted Future Outcomes
  • 5 Pre-Simple Strategies and Complete Strategies
  • 6 Group-Joining Meets
  • 7 Distinguishability
  • 8 Inactivity and Busyness
  • 9 Independence
  • References
  • 17 Biographical Interview
  • 1 School Days
  • 2 From BA at Illinois to Grad School at Yale
  • 3 From Yale to Pittsburgh
  • 4 Employment History at Pitt
  • 5 Visiting Professorships
  • 6 Professional Service
  • 7 Journals
  • 8 Prizes and Fellowships
  • 9 Honors
  • 10 Doctoral Students
  • 11 Publications.

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