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Reflections on the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident : Toward Social-Scientific Literacy and Engineering Resilience.

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Ahn, Joonhong.
Other Authors: Carson, Cathryn., Jensen, Mikael., Juraku, Kohta., Nagasaki, Shinya., Tanaka, Satoru.
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Cham : Springer International Publishing AG, 2014.
Edition:1st ed.
Subjects:
Electronic books.
Online Access:Click to View
Table of Contents:
  • Intro
  • Foreword
  • Preface
  • Acknowledgments
  • Contents
  • 1 Integrating Social-Scientific Literacy in Nuclear Engineering Education
  • Abstract
  • 1.1 Preamble
  • 1.2 GoNERI
  • 1.3 PAGES
  • 1.4 PAGES 2009 and 2010 Summer Schools
  • 1.5 Concept, Aim, and Design of PAGES 2011 Summer School
  • 1.5.1 Planning for PAGES 2011 Summer School
  • 1.5.2 Aim and Design of PAGES 2011 Program
  • 1.5.3 Specific Arrangements for Educational Effectiveness
  • 1.6 Results and Evaluation
  • 1.6.1 Points Discussed During the Program
  • 1.6.2 Evaluation of PAGES 2011
  • 1.7 Concluding Remarks
  • References
  • Part I Understanding the Fukushima Daiichi Accident and Its Consequences
  • 2 Event Sequence of the Fukushima Daiichi Accident
  • Abstract
  • 2.1 Overview of the Accident
  • 2.2 Unprecedented Mega-Earthquake
  • 2.3 Tsunami
  • 2.4 Accident Progression for Units 1-3
  • 2.4.1 Unit 1
  • 2.4.1.1 From the Earthquake to Tsunami Arrival
  • 2.4.1.2 From the Tsunami Arrival to Reactor Water Level Decrease
  • 2.4.1.3 From the Reactor Water Level Decrease to PCV Pressure Increase
  • 2.4.1.4 From Containment Vessel Pressure Increase to Containment Venting Operation
  • 2.4.1.5 From the Containment Venting Operation to Reactor Building Explosion
  • 2.4.1.6 From the Reactor Building Explosion to March 18
  • 2.4.2 Unit 2
  • 2.4.2.1 From the Earthquake to Tsunami Arrival
  • 2.4.2.2 From Tsunami Arrival to Reactor Water Level Increase
  • 2.4.2.3 From Reactor Water Level Increase to Loss of RCIC Functions
  • 2.4.2.4 From Loss of RCIC Functions to Forced Depressurization by SRV Operation
  • 2.4.2.5 From Forced Depressurization by SRV to PCV Pressure Decrease Initiation
  • 2.4.2.6 From PCV Pressure Decrease Initiation to March 18
  • 2.4.3 Unit 3
  • 2.4.3.1 From the Earthquake to Tsunami Arrival
  • 2.4.3.2 From the Tsunami Arrival to RCIC Shutdown.
  • 2.4.3.3 From RCIC Shutdown to HPCI Shutdown
  • 2.4.3.4 From HPCI Shutdown to Reactor Depressurization
  • 2.4.3.5 From Reactor Depressurization to Reactor Building Explosion
  • 2.4.3.6 From the Reactor Building Explosion to Late March
  • 2.5 Present Situation of Cores and PCVs of Units 1-3
  • 2.5.1 Unit 1
  • 2.5.2 Unit 2
  • 2.5.3 Unit 3
  • 2.6 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling
  • 2.7 Plant Explosion
  • 2.7.1 Units 1 and 3
  • 2.7.2 Unit 4
  • 2.8 Concluding Remarks
  • References
  • 3 Analysis of Radioactive Release from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station
  • Abstract
  • 3.1 Introduction
  • 3.2 Methods of Analysis
  • 3.2.1 General Concepts for Various Models
  • 3.2.2 Model 1: Release from Fuel with KnownAssumed Inventory
  • 3.2.3 Model 2: Codes for Severe Accident Progression Analysis
  • 3.2.4 Model 3: Atmospheric Transport Model
  • 3.2.5 Model 4: Ambient Dose Rate from the Contaminated Ground
  • 3.3 Occurrence of the Accident and Release, Transport, and Washout of the Radiation Plume
  • 3.4 Evaluations
  • 3.4.1 Approach Based on Radionuclide Release Analysis: Model 1
  • 3.4.2 Approach Based on Radiation Monitor
  • 3.4.2.1 Result of the Standard Method Based on SPEEDI Simulation: Model 3
  • 3.4.2.2 Alternative Method Based on Ground Shine: Model 4
  • 3.4.2.3 Crosscheck of the Evaluation
  • 3.4.3 Comparison Between Approaches
  • 3.4.4 Contamination and Environmental Cleanup
  • 3.5 Summary and Conclusion
  • References
  • 4 Environmental Contamination and Decontamination After Fukushima Daiichi Accident
  • Abstract
  • 4.1 Prologue
  • 4.2 Environmental Contamination
  • 4.2.1 Surface Radioactivity Concentrations
  • 4.2.1.1 Areal Extension of Contamination
  • 4.2.1.2 Radionuclides of Concern
  • 4.2.1.3 Radioactivity Concentrations
  • 4.2.2 Radiation Doses Due to Contamination
  • 4.2.2.1 Sievert
  • 4.2.2.2 Pathways that Cause Radiation Dose
  • 4.2.2.3 Hourly Dose.
  • 4.2.2.4 Annual Dose
  • 4.2.3 Regulatory Guidelines
  • 4.3 Modeling of Decontamination to Help Decision Making
  • 4.3.1 Purpose of Modeling
  • 4.3.2 Mechanisms Considered in the Model
  • 4.3.2.1 Radioactive Decay
  • 4.3.2.2 Natural Dispersion
  • 4.3.2.3 Artificial Decontamination
  • 4.3.3 Results
  • 4.4 Waste Generation by Decontamination
  • 4.4.1 Model and Data
  • 4.4.2 Results
  • 4.5 Concluding Remarks: Conflicting Values and Motives
  • References
  • 5 Long-Term Energy and Environmental Strategies
  • Abstract
  • 5.1 Introduction
  • 5.2 Regionally Disaggregated DNE21
  • 5.3 Nuclear and Photovoltaic (PV) Modeling
  • 5.4 Model Simulation
  • 5.4.1 Simulation Assumptions and Settings
  • 5.4.2 Calculated Results
  • 5.5 Energy Modeling Challenge After Fukushima
  • 5.6 Conclusion
  • References
  • 6 Impact of Fukushima Daiichi Accident on Japan's Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Spent Fuel Management
  • Abstract
  • 6.1 Status Quo
  • 6.2 How Has This Status Quo Been Generated?
  • 6.3 What Are the Problems with the Current Situation?
  • References
  • 7 Political Impact of the Fukushima Daiichi Accident in Europe
  • Abstract
  • 7.1 Earlier Accidents
  • 7.1.1 The Three Mile Island Accident
  • 7.1.2 The Chernobyl Accident
  • 7.2 The Fukushima Accident and Radiological Impact
  • 7.2.1 The Accident
  • 7.2.2 The Size of the Radiological Impact Outside Japan
  • 7.3 Technical Assessments and Stress Tests in Europe
  • 7.3.1 IAEA Reports
  • 7.3.2 The European Union
  • 7.4 Political Impact in Europe from Fukushima
  • 7.5 Influence of Green Politics in Europe
  • References
  • Part II Etiology
  • 8 Where Was the Weakness in Application of Defense-in-Depth Concept and Why?
  • Abstract
  • 8.1 Introduction
  • 8.2 Weakness in the Application of Defense-in-Depth Concept
  • 8.2.1 Level 1
  • 8.2.1.1 Setting DesignEvaluation Basis
  • 8.2.1.2 Technical Lessons.
  • 8.2.1.3 Possible Cultural Attitude Issue in the Background
  • 8.2.1.4 Possible Institutional Issue in the Background
  • 8.2.2 Level 4
  • 8.2.2.1 Assumptions in Accident Management
  • 8.2.2.2 Technical Lessons
  • 8.2.2.3 Possible Cultural Attitude Issue in the Background
  • 8.2.2.4 Possible Institutional and Societal Issues in the Background
  • 8.2.3 Level 5
  • 8.2.3.1 Identified Problems During the Course of Accident
  • Monitoring and Ingestion Control
  • Computerized Projection System
  • Evacuation
  • Radiation Protection Standards
  • Risk Communication
  • 8.2.3.2 Technical Lessons
  • 8.2.3.3 Possible Cultural Attitude Issue in the Background
  • 8.2.3.4 Possible Institutional and Societal Issues in the Background
  • 8.3 Nuclear Safety Regulation
  • 8.3.1 Two-Agency System
  • 8.3.2 Hardware Focus
  • 8.3.3 Frequent Shuffling
  • 8.4 Differences in Plant Responses Among 17 Nuclear Power Plants
  • 8.5 Cultural Attitude Issues
  • 8.5.1 General Observation
  • 8.5.2 Related Studies
  • 8.5.3 Link with National Culture
  • 8.5.3.1 Collectivism, Group Thinking, Insufficient CriticalReflective Thinking and Questioning Attitude, not Raising Concerns
  • 8.5.3.2 Lack of Big-Picture Thinking, Losing Sight of Substance by Being Distracted by Formality and Details
  • 8.5.3.3 Hardware Culture and Technology-Focus
  • 8.5.3.4 Positive Aspects
  • 8.5.4 Future Directions
  • 8.6 Conclusions
  • References
  • 9 Ethics, Risk and Safety Culture
  • Abstract
  • 9.1 Preamble
  • 9.2 Introduction
  • 9.3 Preliminaries
  • 9.4 Historical Perspective on Culture and Technology
  • 9.5 Safety Culture, Ethics and Risk
  • 9.6 Uncertainty and Safety Philosophy
  • 9.7 Reflections on Fukushima Daiichi
  • 9.8 Where Do We Go from Here?
  • References
  • 10 The "Structural Disaster" of the Science-Technology-Society Interface
  • Abstract
  • 10.1 Introduction.
  • 10.2 The "Structural Disaster" of the Science-Technology-Society Interface
  • 10.3 The Basic Points About the Fukushima Daiichi Accident from the Perspective of "Structural Disaster"
  • 10.4 The Development Trajectory of the Kanpon Type and Its Pitfalls
  • 10.5 The Accident Kept Secret
  • 10.6 The Hidden Accident and the Outbreak of War with the U.S. and Britain: How Did Japan Deal with the Problem?
  • 10.7 The Sociological Implications for the Fukushima Daiichi Accident: Beyond Success or Failure
  • 10.8 Conclusion: Prospects for the Future
  • References
  • 11 Three Mile Island and Fukushima
  • Abstract
  • Part III Basis for Moving Forward
  • 12 Implications and Lessons for Advanced Reactor Design and Operation
  • Abstract
  • 12.1 Short Reflection of Basic Safety Issues
  • 12.2 Lessons Learned and Recommendations Derived
  • 12.2.1 Natural Hazards
  • 12.2.2 Emergency Power Supply
  • 12.2.3 Loss of Heat Sink
  • 12.2.4 Hydrogen Detonation
  • 12.2.5 Measurement at Severe Accidents
  • 12.2.6 Management of Severe Accident
  • 12.3 Recommendations and Requirements Derived from Lessons Learned
  • 12.4 Examples for Potential Countermeasures andor Technologies to be Applied
  • 12.4.1 External Events
  • 12.4.1.1 Earthquake
  • 12.4.1.2 Tsunami
  • 12.4.2 Design of Buildings, Systems and Components
  • 12.4.2.1 Sites with More Than One Reactor
  • 12.4.2.2 Off-Site and On-Site Electricity Supply
  • 12.4.2.3 Bunkering of Buildings with Safety Related Systems
  • Emergency Feed Building
  • Robustness of Cooling Chain in BWRs and PWRs
  • 12.4.2.4 Passive Components and Systems Using Natural Forces
  • Isolation Condenser
  • Gravity Driven Cooling System
  • Passive Containment Cooling System
  • Emergency Condenser
  • Containment Cooling Condenser
  • Passive Pressure Pulse Transmitter
  • Passive Residual Heat Removal System
  • Passive Containment Cooling System.
  • Advanced Accumulator.

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