Complications and Quandaries in the ICT Sector : Standard Essential Patents and Competition Issues.
Main Author: | |
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Other Authors: | , |
Format: | eBook |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Singapore :
Springer Singapore Pte. Limited,
2017.
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Edition: | 1st ed. |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | Click to View |
Table of Contents:
- Intro
- Acknowledgements
- Contents
- Editors and Contributors
- Introduction
- 1 National Disparities and Standards Essential Patents: Considerations for India
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Standards and the International Standard-Setting Landscape
- 3 Firm-Level Participation in Standard-Setting
- 4 Patents and Standards
- 4.1 Patenting Standards
- 4.2 SSO Patent Policies
- 5 Impact of Patents on International Participation in Standard-Setting
- 5.1 Patenting by SSO Participants
- 5.2 Patent Licensing Dynamics
- 6 Potential Responses
- 6.1 Embrace the Status Quo
- 6.2 Adopt Protectionist Measures
- 6.3 Increase Patenting by Local Firms
- 6.4 Benefits of Increased SSO Participation by Local Firms
- 6.5 Incentivizing Increased SSO Participation
- 6.6 Applications in India
- 7 Conclusion
- 2 FRAND Commitments and Royalties for Standard Essential Patents
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Industry Standards
- 3 Standard Setting Organizations and Standard Essential Patent Licensing
- 4 SSO Licensing Policies and FRAND Commitments
- 5 FRAND Terms Determination and Recent U.S. Court Decisions
- 5.1 FRAND Commitments Are Binding
- 5.2 Additional Requirements for FRAND Analysis
- 6 Impact of FRAND on Patent Royalties
- 7 Federal Circuit Ruling on CSIRO and the Relevance of FRAND Commitments
- 8 Conclusion
- 3 The Policy Implications of Licensing Standard Essential FRAND-Committed Patents in Bundles
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Important Economic Principles
- 2.1 The Single Rent Theorem
- 2.2 The Economic Literature on Bundling
- 3 Tying and Bundling with FRAND-Committed Patents
- 3.1 Patent Holders with Licensing Options Outside of the Standard-An Alternative Interpretation of B and S
- 3.2 Licensing FRAND-Committed and Non-FRAND-Committed Patents Together
- 4 Policy Implications.
- 4 Calculating FRAND Licensing Fees: A Proposal of Basic Pro-competitive Criteria
- 1 Introduction
- 2 First Step: Precise Identification of, and Fees' Strictly Proportional to, the Technology to Be Effectively Adopted by the Willing Licensees
- 3 Second Step: Royalties Determination Ex ante, i.e., Taking into Account the Value of the Patent Prior to the Standard Setting
- 4 Third Step: Looking at the Overall Licensing Scenario and Royalty Stacking Issues
- 5 Fourth Step: Dynamic Approach to FRAND Royalties' Determination
- 6 Conclusion
- 5 Selected Issues in SEP Licensing in Europe: The Antitrust Perspective
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The Standardization Process, Its Benefits and the Risks for Competition
- 3 The FRAND Commitment
- 4 Portfolio Licensing
- 4.1 Patent Law Issues
- 4.2 EU Competition Law Issues
- 4.3 Component-Level Licensing
- 5 SEP Transfers and PAEs
- 5.1 Potential Issues
- 6 Competition, Intellectual Property Rights and Collaboratively Set Standards: Federal Trade Commission Advocacy and Enforcement
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 The FTC's Tools to Promote Innovation and Competition
- 1.2 The Intersection of Intellectual Property Law and Antitrust Law
- 2 FTC Policy Reports Discuss Economic Issues Raised by Collaborative Standard Setting
- 3 The FTC's Enforcement and Advocacy Regarding Standardization in the 1980s
- 3.1 American Society of Mechanical Engineers v. Hydrolevel Corporation
- 3.2 In re American Society of Sanitary Engineering
- 3.3 Allied Tube &
- Conduit Corporation v. Indian Head, Inc.
- 4 The FTC's Enforcement Regarding Standard Setting Conduct Involving Patented Technologies
- 4.1 In re Dell Computer Corporation
- 4.2 In re Union Oil Company of California
- 4.3 In re Rambus, Incorporated
- 4.4 In re Negotiated Data Solutions.
- 5 The FTC's Enforcement and Advocacy Regarding the Voluntary FRAND Commitment
- 5.1 The Interpretation of the FRAND Commitment
- 5.2 Competition Advocacy Regarding Remedies for Infringement of a FRAND-Encumbered Patent
- 5.3 Enforcement Actions Regarding Seeking Injunctive Relief on FRAND-Encumbered Patents
- 5.3.1 In re Robert Bosch GmbH
- 5.3.2 In re Google, Inc. and Motorola Mobility, Inc.
- 6 Conclusion
- 7 Standard Setting Organizations and Competition Laws: Lessons and Suggestions from the United States
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The Holdup Problem
- 2.1 Disclosure of Standard-Essential Patents
- 2.2 RAND Commitments
- 3 Do U.S. Antitrust Laws Require Vague Royalty Commitments?
- 3.1 Relevant Antitrust Principles
- 3.2 The Standards Development Organization Advancement Act
- 3.3 Statements of Antitrust Enforcers
- 3.4 Required Disclosure of License Demands
- 4 Recommendations
- 4.1 Mandatory Disclosures
- 4.2 Precautions
- 5 Conclusion
- 8 FRAND in India
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Hold-Up and Hold-Out
- 3 U.S. and EU Law on Injunctive Relief for FRAND-Assured SEPs
- 4 The Case Against Special Legislation or Amendments to Regulate FRAND Licensing
- 5 The Dangers of Adopting a One-Size-Fits-All Template for SDOs
- 6 Problems with Regulating Royalty Rates or Prohibiting "Excessive Pricing"
- 7 Non-disclosure Agreements and Transparency
- 8 Settlement and Remedies for Disputes Involving FRAND-Assured SEPs
- 9 Conclusion
- 9 CCI's Investigation of Abuse of Dominance: Adjudicatory Traits in Prima Facie Opinion
- 1 Introduction
- 2 CCI v Ericsson: The Jurisdiction of CCI Upheld by Delhi High Court
- 3 Initial Investigation Orders by CCI
- 3.1 Abuse of Dominance Investigation Under the Competition Act
- 3.2 Prima Facie Order of Investigation: Guidelines from Non-ICT Cases.
- 4 The Practice Followed by CCI in Prima Facie Orders and the ICT Sector
- 5 Information Considered at the Prima Facie Stage in ICT Sector
- 6 Conclusion.