Competition Authorities in South Eastern Europe : Building Institutions in Emerging Markets.
Main Author: | |
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Other Authors: | |
Format: | eBook |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Cham :
Springer International Publishing AG,
2018.
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Edition: | 1st ed. |
Series: | Contributions to Economics Series
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | Click to View |
Table of Contents:
- Intro
- Foreword
- Contents
- List of Contributors
- Introduction
- Western Balkans and the Design of Effective Competition Law: The Role of Economic, Institutional and Cultural Characteristics
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Models of Competition Policy Regime
- 2.1 Institutional Set-Up
- 2.1.1 The General Model and the Independence and Accountability of the Competition Authority
- 2.1.2 Scope of the Enforcement and Other Powers
- 2.1.3 Investigative and Sanctioning Power
- 2.1.4 Implementation of the Rules
- 2.1.5 Interpretation of the Substantive Rules
- 2.1.6 Sanction Policy
- 2.1.7 Priority Setting
- 3 Emerging Economies and the Shape of Competition Policy
- 3.1 Economic Characteristics
- 3.1.1 Barriers to Entry and the Role of the Government
- 3.1.2 Sectoral Composition of Output/Domestic Consumption
- 3.1.3 Informal Economy
- 3.2 Institutional Characteristics
- 3.3 Cultural Characteristics
- 4 Emerging Economies and the Shape of Competition Policy
- 4.1 Economic Characteristics
- 4.1.1 Barriers to Entry, Economic Activity and the Role of the State
- 4.1.2 Sectoral Composition of Output
- 4.1.3 Informal Economy
- 4.2 Institutional Characteristics
- 4.3 Cultural Characteristics
- 5 Conclusions
- References
- Middle Income Convergence Trap and the Role of Competition Policy in SEE Countries
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Engines of Economic Growth: The Mechanics of Middle Income Convergence Trap
- 3 Different Competition Policies for Different Per Capita Income Levels?
- 4 SEE Countries: In the Middle of the Convergence Trap?
- 5 Elements of Competition Policy for the SEE Countries
- 6 Conclusion
- References
- Institutional Design of State Aid Authorities in South East Europe: The Unfit Legal Transplant and Its Ramifications
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Duty to Introduce State Aid Control.
- 3 Types of State Aid Authorities in SEE Countries
- 3.1 Authority Closely Linked to the Government
- 3.2 Independent Authority Accountable to Parliament
- 4 Concluding Remarks: The Reasons for Inefficiency
- References
- Antitrust, Mergers, State Aid and Consumer Protection Under the Same Roof: Does Political Compromise Prevail over the Expert A...
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Institutional Capacities
- 3 Competition Authorities: What Should They Protect
- 4 How Should Competition Authorities Be Organised?
- 5 Antitrust, State Aid and Consumer Protection Under One Roof
- 6 Concluding Remarks
- References
- Realigning Competition Advocacy Priorities in the Context of Economic Adjustment Programmes: The Greek Case
- 1 Introduction
- 2 State-of-Play Before the Adjustment Programme
- 3 Increased Focus on Advocacy: Realigned Strategy
- 4 Liberalization of Professional Services
- 5 Greeceś OECD Competition Assessment Project
- 5.1 First Competition Assessment Project
- 5.2 Second Competition Assessment Project
- 5.3 Third Competition Assessment Project
- 6 Other Initiatives Regarding Regulatory Distortions Mostly Affecting Retail and the Food Supply Chain
- 7 Overall Progress: Indices
- 8 Competition Compliance and Awareness Guides and Other Outreach Activities
- 8.1 Trade Associations
- 8.2 Public Procurement and Bid-Rigging
- 8.3 Franchising
- 8.4 Regulatory Impact Assessment: Legislative Process
- 9 Concluding Remarks
- References
- The Role of Competition Advocacy: The Serbian Experience
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The Definition and Importance of Competition Advocacy
- 3 Competencies of the Serbian Commission
- 4 Serbian Experience
- 4.1 Non-binding Opinions
- 4.2 Advocacy with Local Authorities
- 4.3 Market Studies
- 4.4 Cooperation with Sector Regulators
- 4.5 Building Public Awareness of Competition Policy.
- 5 Lessons Learnt
- 6 Conclusion
- References
- Considerations Determining the Extent of Economic Analysis and the Choice of Legal Standards in Competition Law Enforcement
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Considerations that Influence the Choice of Legal Standards and the Extent of Economic Analysis in CL Enforcement
- 2.1 Welfare-Related Considerations
- 2.2 The Role of the Substantive Standard (SS)
- 2.3 The Effect of Reputation on the Choice of Standards
- 3 A Practical Approach to Choosing Legal Standards that Minimise Decision Errors
- 4 Concluding Remarks
- References
- Three Economistś Tools for Antitrust Analysis: A Non-technical Introduction
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Critical Loss Analysis
- 2.1 Critical Loss Analysis for Market Definition
- 2.1.1 Implicit Elasticities
- 2.1.2 Cost Estimates: Marginal vs. Variable, Constant vs. Fixed
- 2.1.3 The SSNIP
- 2.1.4 Market Definition Is Not the Whole Story
- 2.2 Critical Loss Analysis for Unilateral Effects Analysis
- 3 Upward Pricing Pressure
- 3.1 How to Use GUPPI?
- 3.2 GUPPI to UPP
- 3.3 The Diversion Ratio
- 3.4 The Limits of UPP and GUPPI
- 4 The Vertical Arithmetic
- 5 Conclusion
- References
- Pricing Benchmark in Market Definition: Theoretical Background and Practical Application
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The Methodological Approach to Defining the Relevant Market
- 3 Theoretical Foundations of Price-Based Tests
- 3.1 Price Correlation Analysis
- 3.2 Stationarity Test
- 3.3 Cointegration Test
- 3.4 Granger Causality Test
- 4 Summary of Case Studies
- 5 Practical Application of Price-Based Tests
- 5.1 Price Correlation Test
- 5.2 Stationarity Test (Unit Root Test)
- 5.3 Cointegration Test
- 5.4 Granger Causality Test
- 6 Conclusion
- References
- The Rationale for Using the Classic Cournot Mechanism in Merger Control
- 1 Introduction.
- 2 The Rationale for Cournot Mechanism
- 2.1 Cournot Mechanism as the Reduced Form of the Two-Stage Competition
- 2.1.1 Second Stage-Pricing Subgame
- 2.1.2 First Stage-The Choice of Capacities
- 2.2 Cournotś Mechanism and Traditional Unilateral Effects Reasoning
- 3 Cournotś Model and Calibrated Merger Simulation
- 3.1 Demand and Cost Functional Form
- 3.2 Model Calibration
- 4 Concluding Remarks
- References
- Difference-in-Differences as a Tool for Ex-Post Analysis of Mergers: The Case of a Merger in the Romanian Retail Market
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The Difference-in-Differences Technique
- 3 Applying the Methodology: Main Assumptions and Decisions
- 4 Results
- 5 Conclusions
- References.