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|a 9783631754474
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|z 9783631556085
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|a (MiAaPQ)EBC30686314
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|a (Au-PeEL)EBL30686314
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|a (OCoLC)1397572386
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|a MiAaPQ
|b eng
|e rda
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|c MiAaPQ
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|a Maute, Jutta.
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|a Hyperinflation, Currency Board, and Bust :
|b The Case of Argentina.
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|a 1st ed.
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|a Frankfurt a.M. :
|b Peter Lang GmbH, Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften,
|c 2006.
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|c ©2006.
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|a 1 online resource (294 pages)
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|a text
|b txt
|2 rdacontent
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|a computer
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|2 rdamedia
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|a online resource
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|2 rdacarrier
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|a Hohenheimer Volkswirtschaftliche Schriften Series ;
|v v.56
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|a Cover -- FIGURES -- ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS -- ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS -- 1 INTRODUCTION -- 2 ARGENTINA'S STABILISATION CHALLENGE -- 2.1 PRECEDING STABILISATION ATTEMPTS SINCE THE DAYS OF PERÓN -- 2.2 HIGH AND HYPERINFLATION IN ARGENTINA IN THE 1980s -- 2.2.1 Rising Money Stock -- 2.2.2 Government Finance -- 2.2.2.1 Inflationary Bias of Governments -- 2.2.2.2 Debt Structure -- 2.2.2.3 Are Budget Deficits a Cause or a Consequence of Inflation? -- 2.2.2.4 Erosion of Tax System -- 2.2.2.5 Lack of Structured Budgeting Process -- 2.2.2.6 Inflation Tax -- 2.2.3 Monetary Regime -- 2.2.3.1 Monetary Constitution -- 2.2.3.2 Monetary Policy -- 2.2.4 Inflation Expectations -- 2.2.5 Symptoms of High Inflation -- 2.2.5.1 Decreasing Demand for Real Money Stock -- 2.2.5.2 Currency Substitution -- 2.2.5.3 Undervaluation as a Consequence of Currency Substitution -- 2.2.5.4 Acceleration and Variability of Inflation -- 2.2.5.5 Real Price and Wage Variability -- 2.2.5.6 Distortion and Excess Variability of Relative Prices -- 2.2.5.7 Contracting Strategies -- 2.2.5.8 Disappearance of Markets -- 2.2.5.9 Economic Performance -- 2.2.5.10 External Trade -- 2.2.5.11 Distributional Effects of High Inflation -- 2.2.6 From High to Hyperinflation -- 2.3 OPTIONS FOR STABILISATION IN THE BEGINNING 1990s -- 2.3.1 Political Feasibility of Reforms -- 2.3.2 Shape of Reforms Ending Hyperinflation -- 2.3.2.1 Monetary and Fiscal Reform -- 2.3.2.2 External Anchor: Fixing the Exchange Rate -- 2.3.3 Argentina's Choice -- 3 STABILISATION VIA CURRENCY BOARD -- 3.1 THE CURRENCY BOARD IDEA -- 3.1.1 The Term -- 3.1.2 The Concept -- 3.1.3 Currency Board vs. Other Fixed Exchange Rate Arrangements -- 3.1.4 Currency Board vs. Central Bank -- 3.1.5 Excursus: Doctrinal History and the Currency Board Idea -- 3.1.5.1 Doctrinal Positions: Mercantilist vs. Classical Views.
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|a 3.1.5.2 The Bullionist and Banking-Currency Controversies -- The Early 19th Century Bullionist Controversy -- The 1840s Banking-Currency Controversy -- Findings with Hindsight -- 3.1.5.3 The Currency Board and Classical Monetary Theory -- 3.1.5.4 From Colonial to Present-Day Currency Boards -- Rationale of Colonial Currency Boards -- Currency Boards Since 1849 -- 3.2 THE SPECIFICS AND FUNCTIONING OF A CURRENCY BOARD -- 3.2.1 Constitutional Elements of a Currency Board -- 3.2.1.1 Anchor Currency -- 3.2.1.2 Fixed Exchange Rate -- 3.2.1.3 Full Convertibility -- 3.2.1.4 Conduct of Monetary Policy -- Control of Private Money Creation -- Clearing and Day-to-Day Monetary Operations -- Lender of Last Resort Function -- 3.2.1.5 Conduct of Fiscal Policy -- 3.2.1.6 Institutional Preconditions -- 3.2.2 Strengths and Weaknesses of a Currency Board -- 3.2.2.1 Strengths of a Currency Board -- Simplicity and Transparency -- Credibility -- Currency Stability -- Interest Rate Convergence -- Financial Intermediation -- 3.2.2.2 Weaknesses of a Currency Board -- Nominal Exchange Rate Rigidity and Exchange Rate Misalignments -- Financial Fragility in the Absence of a Lender of Last Resort -- Loss of Other Central Bank Functions -- Constraints on Fiscal Policy -- 3.2.3 Considerations for Adopting a Currency Board -- 3.2.3.1 When is a Currency Board an Appropriate Choice? -- 3.2.3.2 Implementation of a Currency Board -- 3.2.4 Duration and Termination of a Currency Board -- 3.2.4.1 Currency Board: Permanent or Transitional Arrangement? -- 3.2.4.2 Exit Options -- Built-in Escape Clauses -- Depreciation -- Appreciation -- Switch to a Floating Exchange Rate -- Switch in the Peg -- 3.2.5 Dual Currency Boards: An Extended Proposal for Currency Stability -- 4 THE ARGENTINE CURRENCY BOARD ARRANGEMENT -- 4.1 FEATURES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARGENTINE CBA -- 4.1.1 The Legal Fixing.
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|a 4.1.1.1 The Convertibility Law -- 4.1.1.2 The New Central Bank Law -- 4.1.2 Assessment of the Argentine CBA's Configuration -- 4.1.2.1 Orthodox and Non-Orthodox Elements -- 4.1.2.2 The Choice of the Anchor and the Rate -- 4.1.2.3 Suboptimal Currency Area -- 4.2 THE STABILISATION TRACK DURING THE 1990s -- 4.2.1 The Early 1990s' Economic Reforms -- 4.2.1.1 Further Reforms Shaping the Monetary Frame -- 4.2.1.2 Brady Restructuring -- 4.2.1.3 Tax Reforms -- 4.2.1.4 Federal Fiscal Relations -- 4.2.1.5 Privatisation and Deregulation -- 4.2.1.6 Financial Sector Reform -- 4.2.1.7 Social Security Reform -- 4.2.1.8 Labour Market Reforms -- 4.2.1.9 Trade Liberalisation -- 4.2.2 The Early 1990s' Economic Performance: 1991-1994 -- 4.2.2.1 Monetary and Financial Development -- 4.2.2.2 Economic Activity -- 4.2.2.3 Fiscal Development -- 4.2.2.4 Unemployment and Income Distribution -- 4.2.3 Coping with the Tequila Crisis: 1995 -- 4.2.3.1 The Tequila Effect -- 4.2.3.2 Currency and Bank Run -- 4.2.3.3 Managing the Crisis -- 4.2.3.4 Financial Sector Reforms in the Wake of Tequila -- 4.2.3.5 Fiscal Adjustment Following Tequila -- 4.2.4 The Second Expansionary Phase after Tequila: 1996-1998 -- 4.2.5 The Late 1990s' Recession: 1999-2001 -- 4.2.5.1 The Asian, Russian, and Brazilian Crises -- 4.2.5.2 More Adverse External Shocks -- 4.2.5.3 Recession cum Deflation -- 4.2.5.4 Real Appreciation of the Peso -- 4.2.5.5 Fiscal Atrophy -- 4.2.5.6 Limited Financial Sector Robustness -- 4.2.5.7 Further Labour Market Reforms -- 4.2.6 The Run Up to the Collapse: 2001 -- 4.2.6.1 Meddling with the CBA -- 4.2.6.2 Emission of Quasi-Monies -- 4.2.6.3 Social and Political Overflow, and the End of the CBA -- 4.2.7 A Sketch of the Post-Collapse -- 5 WHAT WENT WRONG? -- 5.1 THE MAIN SUSPECTS -- 5.1.1 Fiscal Imbalance -- 5.1.1.1 Persistent Budget Deficits -- 5.1.1.2 Total Indebtedness.
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|a 5.1.2 Overvalued Exchange Rate -- 5.1.2.1 Real Appreciation before 1998 -- 5.1.2.2 The Real Exchange Rate after 1998 -- 5.1.3 Sudden Stop -- 5.1.3.1 Leveraged Argentina -- 5.1.3.2 Debt Sustainability -- 5.1.3.3 The Sudden Stop in the Region -- 5.1.4 Shock Exacerbation within MERCOSUR -- 5.1.4.1 1994-1998: Fixed Here, Fixed plus Sterilisation There -- 5.1.4.2 1999-2001: Fixed Here, Floating plus Sterilisation There -- 5.1.4.3 Exposed within MERCOSUR -- 5.1.5 Institutional Defects -- 5.1.5.1 Insufficient Labour Market Reforms -- 5.1.5.2 Insufficient Diversification of Production -- 5.1.5.3 Banking Sector Reforms Impaired -- 5.1.5.4 Other Deficient Reforms -- 5.1.6 Politics -- 5.1.7 The IMF -- 5.1.7.1 The IMF and the CBA -- 5.1.7.2 Outline of the IMF's Engagement 1991-2001 -- 5.1.7.3 The Role of the IMF during 1991 to 2000 -- 5.1.7.4 The Role of the IMF in the Crisis -- 5.1.7.5 The Fund's Responsibilities -- 5.1.8 The Washington Consensus -- 5.1.9 The Currency Board Itself -- 5.2 TAKING STOCK -- 5.2.1 Vulnerability -- 5.2.2 Triggers -- 5.3 MISSED OPPORTUNITIES? -- 5.3.1 Soft Exit during 1993/1994 -- 5.3.2 Soft Exit during the Second Expansionary Phase -- 5.3.3 Hard Exit after the External Shocks of the Late Nineties -- 5.3.4 Exit towards Full Dollarisation until 1999 -- 5.3.5 Dollarisation in the Midst of Crisis -- 6 CONCLUSION -- Some Lessons -- Argentina's New Challenge -- BIBLIOGRAPHY -- STATISTICAL APPENDIX -- Macro Indicators -- Financial and Banking Indicators -- Fiscal Indicators -- Distribution and Poverty Indicators -- Selected Data.
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|a Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.
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|a Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2023. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.
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|a Electronic books.
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|i Print version:
|a Maute, Jutta
|t Hyperinflation, Currency Board, and Bust
|d Frankfurt a.M. : Peter Lang GmbH, Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften,c2006
|z 9783631556085
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| 797 |
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|a ProQuest (Firm)
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| 830 |
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|a Hohenheimer Volkswirtschaftliche Schriften Series
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| 856 |
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|u https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/matrademy/detail.action?docID=30686314
|z Click to View
|
