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Industrial Concentration and the Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis : A Critical Evaluation on the Basis of Effective Competition.

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Rittaler, Jan B.
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Frankfurt a.M. : Peter Lang GmbH, Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1989.
Edition:1st ed.
Series:Hohenheimer Volkswirtschaftliche Schriften Series
Subjects:
Electronic books.
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Table of Contents:
  • Cover
  • Introduction: Antitrust Economics, Policy, and Law at the Crossroads: A Reorientation
  • I. The Context
  • II. Developments in U.S. Antitrust Policy During the 1970s and 1980s
  • 1. Antitrust Economics
  • 2. Antitrust Enforcement
  • a. The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice
  • b. The Federal Trade Commission
  • 3. Antitrust Adjudication
  • 4. Antitrust Legislation
  • III. The Source of Reorientation: The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis
  • 1. The Foundations
  • 2. Chicago Antitrust Philosophy
  • IV. Definition of the Field of Research and Course of Inquiry
  • Part 1: Analytical Framework for the Evaluation of Restraints of Competition by Industrial Concentration
  • I. Free Enterprise System. Competition, and Public Policy
  • 1. Economic Order and Competition
  • 2. Nature and Meaning of Competition
  • 3. Competition and Public Policy
  • II. Economic Evaluation of Industrial Concentration: Theoretical Approach and Public Policy
  • 1. Antitrust Policy Objectives
  • a. Objectives and Interrelations
  • b. Conflicting Objectives
  • 2. Elements of the Approach to an Evaluation of Industrial Concentration
  • a. Models of Competition
  • b. The Structure-, Conduct-, Performance-Paradigm, and the Competitive Process
  • c. Effective Competition and Competition Impairment
  • d. Intensity of Competition and the Adequate Test
  • 3. The Treatment of Competition Impairment and Public Policy Alternatives
  • a. Approaches
  • b. Rules
  • III. Competition and Industrial Concentration
  • 1. Concentration and Economic Theory
  • a. Nature and Meaning of Economic Concentration
  • b. Economic Concentration and Power
  • c. Features of Industrial Concentration
  • aa. Significance
  • bb. Causes
  • cc. Effects
  • d. Forms of Industrial Concentration
  • aa. Internal Growth
  • bb. External Growth
  • (1) Horizontal Mergers
  • (2) Vertical Mergers.
  • (3) Conglomerate Mergers
  • 2. Measurement of Industrial Concentration
  • a. Analysis of Industrial Concentration
  • b. Defining the Relevant Market
  • c. Measures of Industrial Concentration
  • IV. Concluding Remarks
  • Part 2: The Central Elements of the Current Theoretical Edifice
  • I. The Current Debate on The Goals of Antitrust: Economics or Sociopolitics?
  • 1. The Current Efficiency-Orientation
  • 2. Evidence of the Goals of Antitrust
  • a. Legislative History of the Antitrust Statutes
  • b. Adjudicative Development
  • c. Plausibility Considerations
  • 3. Antitrust Legislation and Rent-Seeking Behavior
  • 4. The German Case
  • II. Methodology and Theoretical Model Underlying the Evaluation of the Competitiveness of Mergers
  • 1. The General Methodology of Analysis
  • a. Neoclassical Price Theory as an Instrument of Analysis
  • b. Price/Quantity-Interrelations as Indicators of Consumer Welfare
  • c. The General Methodology: Conclusions
  • 2. Mergers, Efficiency, and the Model for Evaluation
  • a. Consumer Welfare and Efficiency: Remarks on Interdependence
  • b. The Incorporation of Current Efficiency Considerations
  • c. The Partial Equilibrium Trade-Off Model Reconsidered
  • d. Qualifications to the Model
  • aa. Premises and Assumptions
  • bb. General Welfare Measurement
  • cc. Allocative Efficiency
  • dd. Productive Efficiency
  • ee. Transfer of Wealth
  • III. Impediments to New Competition
  • 1. Perfect Competition, Monopoly, and Potential Competition
  • 2. The Meaning, Definition, and Importance of Barriers to New Competition
  • 3. The Measurement of Barriers to New Competition
  • 4. Kinds of Barriers to New Competition and their Sources: Plausibility and Empirical Evidence
  • a. Structural Barriers
  • aa. Economies of Large Scale
  • bb. Absolute Cost Advantages
  • cc. Product Differentiation Advantages
  • b. Strategic Barriers.
  • c. Legal and Administrative Barriers
  • d. Barriers to Exit
  • 5. An Evaluation of Impediments to New Competition
  • IV. Concluding Remarks
  • Part 3: Industrial Concentration through Horizontal Mergers: Effects on Performance
  • I. The Economic Rationale Underlying the Traditional Merger Policy
  • 1. The Content of the Concentration-Collusion Doctrine
  • 2. Economic Returns as a Standard of Measurement
  • 3. Empirical Attempts to Verify the Concentration-Collusion Doctrine
  • a. Empirical Evidence
  • aa. Concentration and Prices
  • bb. Concentration, Profit Rates, and Price-Cost Margins
  • b. Collusion and "Critical Levels" of Concentration
  • c. The Suitability of the Different Performance Criteria
  • d. Insufficiencies of Traditional Studies
  • II. The Validity of the Mainline Paradigm and the New Learning-Hypothesis
  • 1. Efficiency as a Cause of Concentration
  • 2. Concentration as a Possible Cause of Collusion
  • 3. The Theoretical Basis and the Empirical Evidence of the New Learning-Hypothesis
  • 4. Revised Policy Conclusions for Horizontal Mergers
  • 5. Critical Evaluation of the New Learning-Hypotheses, the Underlying Premises, and their Empirical Evidence
  • a. Impediments to Competition
  • b. Accounting Data and the Data Base
  • c. The Core of the Oligopoly and Other Omissions
  • d. The Persistence of Profits in the Long Run
  • III. Firm Market Share as the Essential Determinant of Interfirm Profitability Differences
  • 1. Interfirm Profitability Differences: Efficiency or Market Power?
  • 2. The Range of Economies of Size as an Alternative Explanatory Approach
  • 3. The Evidence of Efficiency on the Basis of Merger Performance
  • IV. Concluding Remarks
  • Part 4: Vertical Mergers: Anticompetitive Effects and the Attainment of Efficiencies
  • I. Vertical Integration and Efficiency-Enhancement.
  • 1. Transaction-Costs and Different Mechanisms for the Organization of Economic Exchange
  • a. Economic Exchange via Markets: Costs of Using the Price Mechanism
  • b. Economic Exchange via Organizations: Costs of Using Internal Organization
  • 2. Efficiency-Enhancement as the Underlying Reasoning for Vertical Integration
  • 3. Efficiency Gains vs. Anticompetitive Consequences: Necessity for a Trade-Off?
  • II. Empirical Evidence on the Extent of Vertical Integration and Associated Efficiency Advantages
  • 1. The Measurement of the Extent of Vertical Integration
  • 2. The Empirical Evidence on Efficiency-Enhancement
  • a. Studies on Transaction-Specific Market Characteristics
  • b. Studies on Actual Cost Savings
  • 3. A Critical Review of the Applicability of the Transaction-Cost Approach to an Efficiency Analysis of Vertical Integration
  • III. An Evaluation of Possible Anticompetitive Consequences Resulting from Vertical Integration
  • 1. The Reasoning Underlying Anticipated Anticompetitive Consequences: Foreclosure of Actual and Potential Competitors
  • 2. Particular Anticompetitive Effects Associated with Foreclosure
  • a. Price and Output Consequences
  • b. Price and Supply Squeeze
  • c. Price Discrimination
  • d. Impediments to New Competition
  • e. Collusive Effects
  • 3. The Likelihood of Anticompetitive Effects and Revised Policy Conclusions
  • IV. Concluding Remarks
  • Résumée: Application of the Results of an Analysis of the Chicago School Approach Towards Industrial Concentration
  • I. The Legal Treatment of Industrial Concentration
  • 1. The Approach
  • 2. The Relevant Statutes
  • 3. The Merger Term in the Statutes
  • 4. The Minimum Thresholds
  • 5. The Point of Intervention
  • 6. Overall Justification
  • II. Trends and Tendencies in Enforcement and Adjudication
  • 1. The Use of Economic Evidence in Enforcement and Adjudication.
  • 2. An Evaluation of Trends and Tendencies
  • a. Determining Market Delineation
  • b. Determining Market Domination
  • aa. Superior Market Position
  • (1) Market Structure
  • (a) Market Share
  • (b) Financial Strength
  • (c) Market Barriers
  • (2) Market Conduct
  • bb. Oligopolistic Domination
  • c. Strengthening Market Domination
  • III. An Evaluation of the Propositions for a Reform of Merger Control in the Fifth Amendment of the ARC
  • 1. Political and Economic Order: Thoughts on Structural Complementarity
  • 2. The Object of Protection: Competition vs. Competitors
  • 3. An Evaluation of the Proposals on the Basis of Our State of Knowledge
  • a. The Proposals
  • b. The Evaluation
  • IV. Concluding Remarks.

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