Cover Image

Democracy, Credibility and Clientelism

The authors demonstrate that sharply different policy choices across democracies can be explained as a consequence of differences in the ability of political competitors to make credible pre-electoral commitments to voters. Politicians can overcome their credibility deficit in two ways. First, they...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Keefer, Philip, Vlaicu, Razvan
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:
BENCHMARK
BENCHMARKS
BUREAUCRACY
CANDIDATES
COLLECTIVE ACTION
CONSTITUENCIES
CORRUPTION
DECISION MAKING
DEMOCRACIES
DEMOCRACY
DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT
DIMINISHING RETURNS
DISCOUNT RATES
ECONOMIC BENEFITS
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
ELECTION
ELECTIONS
ELECTORAL COMPETITION
ELECTORAL INSTITUTIONS
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS
EQUILIBRIUM
EXOGENOUS SHOCKS
EXPENDITURES
GDP
INNOVATIONS
JURISDICTION
LEGISLATORS
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
PER CAPITA INCOME
POLICY INSTRUMENTS
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
POLITICAL PARTIES
POLITICIANS
PRIVATE GOODS
PRODUCTIVITY
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
PUBLIC GOOD
PUBLIC GOODS
PUBLIC INVESTMENT
PUBLIC POLICY
PUBLIC SPENDING
RENTS
RESOURCE ALLOCATION
TRANSPORTATION
UTILITY FUNCTION
VOTER PREFERENCES
VOTER REGISTRATION
VOTERS
VOTING
WEALTH
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/01/5579805/democracy-credibility-clientelism
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8954

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/01/5579805/democracy-credibility-clientelism
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8954

Similar Items