Preview: Optimal Pre-Merger Notification Mechanisms : Incentives and Efficiency of Mandatory and Voluntary Schemes

Optimal Pre-Merger Notification Mechanisms : Incentives and Efficiency of Mandatory and Voluntary Schemes

The authors compare the two merger control systems currently employed worldwide: a mandatory system based on merger size threshold and a voluntary system with ex-post monitoring and fines. The voluntary system possesses two informational advantages...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Benitez, Daniel, Gonzalez, Aldo
Language:	English
Published:	2012
Subjects:	ACQUISITIONS ANTITRUST LAW ASSET VALUE COLLUSION COMPANY COMPETITION LAW COMPETITION POLICY COMPETITIVENESS CORPORATE COUNSEL COUNSEL COURT OF JUSTICE ECONOMIC RESEARCH ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS EQUALITY EX ANTE EX POST EX POST EX POST EXPECTED VALUE FIRMS HORIZONTAL MERGER INDEPENDENT THIRD PARTY INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION INTERESTED PARTIES INVESTIGATION LIMITED MANDATE MERGER MERGER CONTROL MERGERS MONETARY VALUE NASH EQUILIBRIUM PARTY PENALTY PREMERGER NOTIFICATION REMEDIES REMEDY
Online Access:	http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20090519085418 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4130

Optimal Pre-Merger Notification Mechanisms : Incentives and Efficiency of Mandatory and Voluntary Schemes

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