Description: Climate Change and Trade Policy : From Mutual Destruction to Mutual Support

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Climate Change and Trade Policy : From Mutual Destruction to Mutual Support

Contrary to what is still often believed, the climate and trade communities have a lot in common: a common problem (a global "public good"), common foes (vested interests using protection for slowing down climate change policies), and com...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author:	Messerlin, Patrick A.
Language:	English
Published:	2012
Subjects:	ALLOCATION ALUMINUM ANNUAL EMISSIONS AUCTIONS BANKING SECTOR BENEFICIARIES BOILERS BUSINESS PRACTICES CAPS CARBON CARBON ALLOWANCES CARBON CONTENT CARBON EMISSIONS CARBON FOOTPRINT CARBON LEAKAGE CARBON MARKET CARBON POLICIES CARBON PRICES CARBON TAX CARBON TAXES CARBON TRADING CHEMICALS CLEANER TECHNOLOGIES CLIMATE CLIMATE CHANGE CLIMATE CHANGE EFFORTS CLIMATE CHANGE POLICIES CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY CLIMATE POLICY CLOSED ECONOMY CO2 COAL COAL MINING COATINGS COKE OVEN COMMON MARKET CONVERGENCE COPPER CUTTING EMISSIONS DAMAGES DETERGENTS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEVELOPING ECONOMIES DOMESTIC CARBON DURABLE ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC INTEGRATION ECONOMIC WELFARE ELECTRICITY EMERGING ECONOMIES EMISSION EMISSION CUTS EMISSIONS CUTS EMISSIONS TRADING ENERGY POLICY ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENTS EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES EXPORTER EXPORTERS FATS FERROUS METALS FISCAL POLICIES FISCAL POLICY FOREIGN FIRMS FORESTRY FRAUD FRAUDS FREE ALLOWANCES FREE TRADE FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS GAS EXTRACTION GLOBAL CLIMATE GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS GLOBAL MARKETS GLOBAL TRADE GLOBAL WARMING GREENHOUSE GREENHOUSE GAS GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS GREENHOUSE GASES HARMONIZATION IMPORTS INCOME INCOME LEVEL INCOME TAX INDIVIDUAL FIRMS INSTRUMENT INSURANCE INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS INTERNATIONAL TRADE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW INVESTING IRON LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEVEL PLAYING FIELD LEVIES LEVY LIBERALIZATION LIBERALIZATION OF TRADE MANGANESE MARKET ACCESS MARKET SHARE NATURAL GAS NEGATIVE IMPACT NICKEL OIL PRICE OILS OUTPUT OUTPUTS OUTSOURCING PAINTS PESTICIDES PETROLEUM PRODUCTS PHARMACEUTICALS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLLUTERS POTASSIUM PP PRECAUTIONARY APPROACH PRICE BAND PRICE INCREASE PRICE SIGNAL REBATES REGIONAL TRADE RENEWABLE ENERGY RISKS OF CLIMATE CHANGE SMALL COUNTRIES SO2 SULFUR SULFUR DIOXIDE TAX POLICIES TAX RATE TAX RATES TAX REGIME TAX REGIMES TAX SYSTEM TEMPERATURE TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE PROTECTION TRADE REGIME TRADE REGIMES TRADING PARTNERS TRADING SYSTEM TRANSACTION TRANSACTION COSTS TREATIES TREATY UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES URANIUM VALUATION WORLD ECONOMIES WORLD ECONOMY WORLD TRADE ZINC
Online Access:	http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20100726084354 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3862

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Summary:	Contrary to what is still often believed, the climate and trade communities have a lot in common: a common problem (a global "public good"), common foes (vested interests using protection for slowing down climate change policies), and common friends (firms delivering goods, services, and equipment that are both cleaner and cheaper). They have thus many reasons to buttress each other. The climate community would enormously benefit from adopting the principle of "national treatment," which would legitimize and discipline the use of carbon border tax adjustment and the principle of "most-favored nation," which would ban carbon tariffs. The main effect of this would be to fuel a dual world economy of clean countries trading between themselves and dirty countries trading between themselves at a great cost for climate change. And the trade community would enormously benefit from a climate community capable of designing instruments that would support the adjustment efforts to be made by carbon-intensive firms much better than instruments such as antidumping or safeguards, which have proved to be ineffective and perverse. That said, implementing these principles will be difficult. The paper focuses on two key problems. First, the way carbon border taxes are defined has a huge impact on the joint outcome from climate change, trade, and development perspectives. Second, the multilateral climate change regime could easily become too complex to be manageable. Focusing on carbon-intensive sectors and building "clusters" of production processes considered as having "like carbon-intensity" are the two main ways for keeping the regime manageable. Developing them in a multilateral framework would make them more transparent and unbiased.