Recruitment, Effort, and Retention Effects of Performance Contracts for Civil Servants : Experimental Evidence from Rwandan Primary Schools
This paper reports on a two-tiered experiment designed to separately identify the selection and effort margins of pay-for-performance (P4P). At the recruitment stage, teacher labor markets were randomly assigned to a 'pay-for-percentile'...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Language: | English |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2020
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/440111599837928395/Recruitment-Effort-and-Retention-Effects-of-Performance-Contracts-for-Civil-Servants-Experimental-Evidence-from-Rwandan-Primary-Schools http://hdl.handle.net/10986/34481 |
| Summary: | This paper reports on a two-tiered
experiment designed to separately identify the selection and
effort margins of pay-for-performance (P4P). At the
recruitment stage, teacher labor markets were randomly
assigned to a 'pay-for-percentile' or fixed-wage
contract. Once recruits were placed, an unexpected,
incentive-compatible, school-level re-randomization was
performed, so that some teachers who applied for a
fixed-wage contract ended up being paid by P4P, and vice
versa. By the second year of the study, the within-year
effort effect of P4P was 0.16 standard deviations of pupil
learning, with the total effect rising to 0.20 standard
deviations after allowing for selection. |
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