Decentralization and Redistribution : Irrigation Reform in Pakistan's Indus Basin
Does decentralizing the allocation of public resources reduce rent-seeking and improve equity? This paper studies a governance reform in Pakistan's vast Indus Basin irrigation system. Using canal discharge measurements across all of Punjab pro...
| Main Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2018
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/219061519221201138/Decentralization-and-redistribution-irrigation-reform-in-Pakistans-Indus-basin http://hdl.handle.net/10986/29412 |
| Summary: | Does decentralizing the allocation of
public resources reduce rent-seeking and improve equity?
This paper studies a governance reform in Pakistan's
vast Indus Basin irrigation system. Using canal discharge
measurements across all of Punjab province, the analysis
finds that water theft increased on channels taken over by
local farmer organizations compared with channels that
remained bureaucratically managed, leading to substantial
wealth redistribution. The increase in water theft was
greater along channels with larger landowners situated
upstream. These findings are consistent with a model in
which decentralization accentuates the political power of
local elites by shifting the arena in which water rights are contested. |
|---|