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How Adverse Selection Affects the Health Insurance Market

Adverse selection can be defined as strategic behavior by the more informed partner in a contract against the interest of the less informed partner(s). In the health insurance field, this manifests itself through healthy people choosing managed car...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Belli, Paolo
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2014
Subjects:
AGENTS
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
AVERAGE COSTS
COMPENSATION
COMPETITIVE MARKETS
COMPULSORY INSURANCE
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
CROSS SUBSIDIZATION
ECONOMICS
EQUILIBRIUM
FREE ENTRY
HEALTH CARE
HEALTH CONDITIONS
HEALTH INSURANCE
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE
HEALTH INSURERS
HEALTH NEEDS
HEALTH STATUS
IMPERFECT INFORMATION
INCOME
INDEMNITY
INSURANCE COMPANIES
INSURANCE CONTRACTS
INSURANCE MARKETS
INSURANCE OPTIONS
INSURANCE PLANS
INSURANCE SYSTEMS
MARGINAL COST
MARGINAL COSTS
MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
MARKET POWER
MEDICARE
MORAL HAZARD
PARETO OPTIMAL
PARTIAL INSURANCE
PERFECT INFORMATION
POLICY RESEARCH
PREMIUMS
PRIVATE INFORMATION
PRIVATE INSURANCE
PRIVATE SECTOR
PUBLIC HEALTH
PUBLIC INSURANCE
RISK ADJUSTERS
RISK AVERSION
SCALE ECONOMIES
SERVICE DELIVERY
SOCIAL WELFARE
STREAMS
TRANSACTION COSTS
WELFARE FUNCTION
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/03/1047509/adverse-selection-affects-health-insurance-market
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19694

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/03/1047509/adverse-selection-affects-health-insurance-market
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19694

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