Holdings: Behavioral Economics and Public Sector Reform : An Accidental Experiment and Lessons from Cameroon

Behavioral Economics and Public Sector Reform : An Accidental Experiment and Lessons from Cameroon

Starting with the hypothesis that behaviors are the critical (and often overlooked) factor in public sector performance, this paper explores the notion of how behavioral change (and thus institutional change) might be better motivated in the public...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Raballand, Gaël, Rajaram, Anand
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2013
Subjects:	ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTING ADMINISTRATIVE COST AUTHORITY AUTHORIZATION BASIC BEST PRACTICES BLOG BUDGET EXECUTION BUDGET FORMULATION BUDGET MANAGEMENT BUDGET MONITORING BUDGET SYSTEM BUREAUCRACY CAPABILITIES CAPABILITY CAPACITY BUILDING CITIZENS COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS CONSENSUS CONSTITUENCIES CONSTITUTION CORRUPTION CUSTOMS CUSTOMS CLEARANCE CUSTOMS OFFICIALS CUSTOMS REVENUE CUSTOMS REVENUES DECISION MAKING DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRY CONTEXT DOCUMENTATION E-MAIL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT EMBEZZLEMENT ENTERPRISE SURVEY ENVIRONMENTS EQUIPMENT EVASION EXECUTION FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FINANCIAL RESOURCES FINANCIAL SUPPORT FISCAL PRESSURES FRAUD GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE HUMAN RESOURCE HUMAN RESOURCES HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM INNOVATION INSPECTION INSTITUTION INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS INSTITUTIONAL REFORM INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS INTERNAL AUDIT INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS LEARNING LEGISLATION LEGITIMACY LITERATURE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS MARKET ECONOMY MINISTERS MINISTRY OF FINANCE NATIONAL BUDGET NATIONS OPEN ACCESS OPERATIONAL PRINCIPLE ORGANIZATIONAL AUTONOMY PERCEPTION PERCEPTIONS PERVERSE INCENTIVES POLITICAL AUTHORITY POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICIANS POOR GOVERNANCE PRIVATE SECTOR PROCUREMENT PROCUREMENT PROCESSES PROJECT MANAGEMENT PROSPECT THEORY PUBLIC PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PUBLIC FINANCE PUBLIC FINANCE MANAGEMENT PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS PUBLIC MANAGEMENT PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC RESOURCES PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE PUBLIC SECTOR PROJECTS PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM PUBLIC SUPPORT RATIONALIZATION RESULT RESULTS REVENUE COLLECTION REVENUE PERFORMANCE SEARCH STATE FUNDS STATE SECTOR STONE SUPERVISION SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT TARGETS TAXATION TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT TECHNOCRACY TECHNOCRATS TRADE FACILITATION TRAINING COURSES TRANSACTION TRANSPARENCY TREASURY UNEMPLOYMENT USERS WEB
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/09/18220963/behavioral-economics-public-sector-reform-accidental-experiment-lessons-cameroon http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16046

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/09/18220963/behavioral-economics-public-sector-reform-accidental-experiment-lessons-cameroon
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16046

Behavioral Economics and Public Sector Reform : An Accidental Experiment and Lessons from Cameroon

Internet

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