Holdings: Cooperation and Reciprocity in Carbon Sequestration Contracts

Cooperation and Reciprocity in Carbon Sequestration Contracts

This paper studies the role of cooperation and reciprocity on the structure of self-enforcing carbon sequestration contracts. The optimal contract is derived as a result of the optimizing actions of purely self-interested agents, and agents that ac...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author:	Cordero Salas, Paula
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2013
Subjects:	AFFORESTATION AMOUNT OF CREDITS ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION BIODIVERSITY BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION BIOMASS BIOMASS CARBON BREACH BREACHES BUYER BUYERS CARBON CARBON CREDITS CARBON DIOXIDE CARBON EMISSION CARBON EMISSIONS CARBON EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION CARBON LEVEL CARBON MARKET CARBON OFFSETS CARBON SEQUESTRATION CARBON SINK CARBON SINKS CARBON STOCK CARBON STOCKS CARBON STORAGE CLIMATE CLIMATE CHANGE CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION COMPENSATION CONSERVATION OF CARBON CONTRACT DESIGN CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT CONTRACT OBLIGATIONS CONTRACT OFFERS COOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIUM DESIGNING CONTRACTS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT EMAIL ADDRESS EMISSIONS EMISSIONS ABATEMENT EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION ENFORCEABILITY ENFORCEMENT CONSTRAINTS ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS EQUILIBRIUM FINANCIAL SUPPORT FIXED COSTS FOREST FOREST CARBON FOREST CLEARING FOREST CONSERVATION FOREST COVER FOREST DEGRADATION FOREST LAND FOREST LANDS FOREST PROTECTION FORESTRY FORESTS GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE GOOD FAITH GREENHOUSE GREENHOUSE GAS GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS HIDDEN INFORMATION HOLDING INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY CONSTRAINT INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY CONSTRAINTS INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY CONSTRAINT INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY CONSTRAINTS INTERNATIONAL BANK LABOR MARKETS LAND HOLDER LAND HOLDERS LAND RIGHTS LAND USE LAND USES LEGALLY BINDING OBLIGATION LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LONG-TERM AGREEMENT MARKET OPPORTUNITY MATERIAL MONETARY PAYOFF MONETARY PAYOFFS OPEN ACCESS OPPORTUNITY COST OPTIMAL CONTRACT OPTIMAL CONTRACTS PARTICIPATION CONSTRAINT PARTNERSHIP PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES PERFORMANCE MEASURES POLITICAL ECONOMY PROOF OF PROPOSITION RELATIONAL CONTRACT RELATIONAL CONTRACTS REMEDIES REMUNERATION RENEGOTIATION RESULT RESULTS RETURN RETURNS RISK-NEUTRAL SAFETY NETS SELLER SELLERS TECHNICAL ISSUES THIRD PARTY TRADING TRUST FUND UNDER CONTRACT USES VALUATION WEB other-regarding preferences
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/06/17940860/cooperation-reciprocity-carbon-sequestration-contracts http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15880

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/06/17940860/cooperation-reciprocity-carbon-sequestration-contracts
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15880

Cooperation and Reciprocity in Carbon Sequestration Contracts

Internet

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