Cover Image

Comparing Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Assistance

Markets alone cannot provide adequate protection against the risk of unemployment. Private unemployment insurance (UI) fails because of informational problems: the so-called moral hazard (changes in behavior in the presence of insurance that are im...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Vodopevic, Milan
Language:English
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:
ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES
ADVERSE SELECTION
AVERAGE COSTS
BARGAINING
BARGAINING POWER
CONSUMPTION SMOOTHING
DEPENDENTS
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
ELIGIBILITY
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
EMPLOYMENT
ENTITLEMENT
ENTITLEMENTS
EQUILIBRIUM
EQUILIBRIUM UNEMPLOYMENT
EXPENDITURES
INCENTIVE PROBLEMS
INCOME
INCOME DISTRIBUTION
INCOME EFFECT
INCOME SUPPORT
INSURANCE
LABOR FORCE
LABOR MARKET
LABOR MARKETS
LABOR SUPPLY
LEISURE
MARGINAL TAX RATES
MEANS TESTING
MORAL HAZARD
OPPORTUNITY COST
PAYROLL TAXES
POOR
POVERTY REDUCTION
PRIVATE TRANSFERS
PUBLIC SPENDING
RELATIVE VALUE
SAVINGS
SEVERANCE
SEVERANCE PAY
SOCIAL ASSISTANCE
SOCIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
SOCIAL PROTECTION
SOCIAL SECURITY
TARGETING
TAX REVENUES
TRADE UNIONS
TRANSITION ECONOMIES
UNEMPLOYED WORKERS
UNEMPLOYMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT SYSTEMS
UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
WAGE RATES
WAGES
WEALTH
WELFARE EFFECTS
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/02/5172882/comparing-unemployment-insurance-unemployment-assistance
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11811

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/02/5172882/comparing-unemployment-insurance-unemployment-assistance
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11811

Similar Items